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G O V E R N IN G P R IV A C Y IN T H E D A T A F IE D
C IT Y
Ira S. Rubinstein* & Bilyana Petkova**
ABSTRACT

Privacy — understood in terms of freedom from identification,
surveillance, and profiling — is a precondition of the diversity and
tolerance that define the urban experience. But with “smart”
technologies eroding the anonymity of city sidewalks and streets, and
turning them into surveilled spaces, are cities the first to get caught in
the line of fire? Alternatively, are cities the final bastions of privacy?
Will the interaction of tech companies and city governments lead
cities worldwide to converge around the privatization of public spaces
and monetization of data with little to no privacy protections? Or will
we see different city identities take root based on local resistance and
legal action?
This Article delves into these questions from a federalist and
localist perspective. In contrast to other fields in which American
cities lack the formal authority to govern, we show that cities still
enjoy ample powers when it comes to privacy regulation. Fiscal
concerns, rather than state or federal preemption, play a role in
privacy regulation, and the question becomes one of how cities make
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use of existing powers. Populous cosmopolitan cities, with a sizeable
market share and significant political and cultural clout, are in
particularly noteworthy positions to take advantage of agglomeration
effects and drive hard deals when interacting with private firms.
Nevertheless, there are currently no privacy frontrunners or privacy
laggards; instead, cities engage in “privacy activism” and “data
stewardship.”
First, as privacy activists, U.S. cities use public interest litigation to
defend their citizens’ personal information in high profile political
participation and consumer protection cases. Examples include legal
challenges to the citizenship question in the 2020 Census and to
instances of data breaches, including Facebook third-party data
sharing practices and the Equifax data breach. We link the Census
2020 data wars to sanctuary cities’ battles with the federal
administration to demonstrate that political dissent and cities’ social
capital — diversity — are intrinsically linked to privacy. Regarding
the string of data breach cases, cities expand their experimentation
zone by litigating privacy interests against private parties.
Second, cities as data stewards use data to regulate their urban
environment. As providers of municipal services, they collect, analyze
and act on a broad range of data about local citizens or cut deals with
tech companies to enhance transit, housing, utility, telecom, and
environmental services by making them smart while requiring firms
like Uber and Airbnb to share data with city officials. This
relationship has proven contentious at times, but in both North
American and European cities, open data and more cooperative
forms of data sharing between the city, commercial actors, and the
public have emerged, spearheaded by a transportation data trust in
Seattle. This Article contrasts the Seattle approach with the
governance and privacy deficiencies accompanying the privately-led
Quayside smart city project in Toronto. Finally, this Article finds the
data trust model of data sharing to hold promise, not least since the
European rhetoric of exclusively city-owned data presented by
Barcelona might prove difficult to realize in practice.
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INTRODUCTION

What are the laws of privacy in urban settings? Legal scholars
have begun discussing privacy in the narrow context of smart cities,1
but the topic has yet to penetrate the federalism and localism debates.
Our study of privacy in the city demonstrates that as new data-fueled
business models emerge in the urban environment, analysis of the
legal powers of the city may benefit from insights into the relationship
not only among levels of government but also between the private
and the public sector. Cities’ power or powerlessness is not solely
defined by federal and state preemption but might be influenced by a
city’s general fiscal autonomy (including dependence on federal and
state grants), and the policies cities adopt when entering into
partnerships with private corporations.
In contrast to other fields in which U.S. cities lack either the formal
authority or actual capacity to govern,2 the vast majority of cities
retain ample legal powers over the collection and use of personal data

1. See generally Kelsey Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon:
Protecting Privacy in a Hyperconnected Town, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581 (2015);
Liesbet van Zoonen, Privacy Concerns in Smart Cities, 33 GOV’T INFO. Q. 472 (2016).
2. See generally GERALD FRUG & DAVID BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES
STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2008); RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE (2016).
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by city agencies.3 Nevertheless, they often agree to relinquish powers
by outsourcing control to tech companies in exchange for revenue or
data, or in the hope of growing their technology sector in the name of
innovation, jobs, and prosperity. For example, New York City might
not fear state preemption when proposing to amend its administrative
code to prohibit the sharing of location data with third parties.4
However, the same city previously agreed to a deal whereby Sidewalk
Labs — part of the Alphabet conglomerate and a sister company of
Google — installed Wi-Fi kiosks in downtown Manhattan that used
video cameras and Wi-Fi sensors to monitor the movements and
activities of passersby with minimal protection of privacy interests.5
Privacy — on city sidewalks, streets, parks, plazas, and in public
spaces generally — has emerged as an intrinsically urban value.
Social scientists have long emphasized the anonymity of city life and
connected it to the diverse social fabric and the freedom of choice
that makes big cities appealing.6 Diversity and tolerance are natural
and desirable elements of the urban ethos. According to Jane Jacobs,
privacy, as a precondition for both diversity and tolerance, is
“precious in cities. It is indispensable.”7 Jacobs continues: “A good
city street neighborhood achieves a marvel of balance between its
people’s determination to have essential privacy and their
simultaneous wishes for differing degrees of contact, enjoyment or
help from the people around.”8
Intrinsic to city design are also public spaces, to which anonymity is
inherent and which, as we show, are now increasingly being
privatized. Public spaces have a long history as venues for political
3. See generally Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy Localism, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1961
(2018).
4. See
N.Y.C.
Council
Int.
No.
1632
(2019),
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4069480&GUID=6FA801
8C-84A4-4E71-93CE-D467AD53E9EA&Options=ID%7CText
[https://perma.cc/M8NZ-XPQQ].
5. See Ava Kofman, Are New York’s Free LinkNYC Internet Kiosks Tracking
INTERCEPT
(Sept.
8,
2018),
Your
Movements?,
https://theintercept.com/2018/09/08/linknyc-free-wifi-kiosks/
[https://perma.cc/3EPT-23FT]; see infra Part III.
6. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN
CITIES (1961); LYN LOFLAND, A WORLD OF STRANGERS: ORDER AND ACTION IN
URBAN PUBLIC SPACE (1973); RICHARD SENNETT, BUILDING AND DWELLING: ETHICS
FOR THE CITY (2018).
7. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 58.
8. Id. at 59; see also CHRISTENA NIPPERT-ENG, ISLANDS OF PRIVACY 2–3 (2010)
(defining privacy as “selective concealment and disclosure” and as a daily activity of
trying to “deny or grant varying amounts of access to our private matters to specific
people in specific ways”).
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and ideological engagement.9 As philosopher Michael Sandel points
out, public spaces are “traditionally sites for the cultivation of a
common citizenship, so that people from different walks of life
encounter one another and so acquire enough of a shared . . . sense of
a shared life that we can meaningfully think of one another as citizens
in a common venture.”10
In this Article, we ask whether technology is now changing the
conventional wisdom about city life. As cities take on the role of
technology testbeds, in ways never seen before, they become sites for
ever more intrusive surveillance (in the conventional sense of
monitoring behavior, or collecting and analyzing information to
influence, manage, or direct behavior) and newer forms of what many
refer to as “datafication,” which is different from, and less familiar
than, “digitization.” The latter term refers to the use of computing
devices to record, quantify, format, or store data as a series of digits.
In contrast, “datafication” refers to “long-term storage in a format
that is searchable, computationally manipulable, and [that] may be
aggregated with information from other” sources.11 Datafication
thereby makes it possible for organizations to use data in ways that
may have been unanticipated or even technologically infeasible at the
time of collection, and are qualitatively different from the original
purposes of the collection.
Cities are “data-rich environments”12 because their large
populations generate vast amounts of data as they interact with IoT
devices and sensors in public spaces;13 utilize city services that collect,

9. See, e.g., DUNCAN MCLAREN & JULIAN AGYEMAN, SHARING CITIES: A CASE
FOR TRULY SMART AND SUSTAINABLE CITIES 145 (2015) (characterizing public spaces

in the city as “the crucible of democracy”).
10. The Reith Lectures: Michael Sandel, A New Citizenship, Markets and Morals,
BBC RADIO 4 (June 9, 2009) (downloaded using iTunes) cited in DUNCAN MCLAREN
& JULIAN AGYEMAN, SHARING CITIES: A CASE FOR TRULY SMART AND SUSTAINABLE
CITIES 145 (2015); see also LYN LOFLAND, THE PUBLIC REALM: EXPLORING THE
CITY’S QUINTESSENTIAL SOCIAL TERRITORY 234–35 (1998) (identifying the practice
of politics as one of several valuable uses of the public realm).
11. See Katherine Strandburg, Monitoring, Datafication, and Consent: Legal
Approaches to Privacy in the Big Data Context, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 11 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014).
12. Rubinstein, supra note 3, at 1964.
13. IoT (the “Internet of Things”) refers to the information networks comprised
of sensors and other technologies embedded in physical objects and linked via wired
and wireless networks. See FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, COMMENTS OF THE FUTURE
OF PRIVACY FORUM ON CONNECTED SMART TECHNOLOGIES IN ADVANCE OF THE
FTC
“INTERNET
OF
THINGS”
WORKSHOP
3
(2013),
https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/FPF-Comments-Regarding-Internet-of-Things.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UHW8-4DFJ].
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analyze, and optimize personal data;14 and encounter the
special-purpose technologies deployed by law enforcement to
maintain public safety and safeguard citizens against terrorist
attacks.15 This ubiquitous collection of data about all aspects of city
living and the near-constant monitoring of public spaces erodes the
anonymity of urban living. It also threatens the “marvel of balance”16
between wanted and unwanted interaction with other people and
government officials (especially local law enforcement), without
which the diversity and tolerance of city life become unsustainable.
Further, anonymity is but one aspect of privacy — the advent of big
data has seen the emergence of broader concerns intertwined with
privacy, such as lack of algorithmic fairness, accountability, and
transparency. Questions inevitably arise as to how best to counteract
these trends at the local level. Although we acknowledge the
interconnection of the above contexts in which cities are data-rich
environments, hereafter, we zoom in on civic uses of data in various
cities.
Importantly, the comprehensive notion of data privacy that we
adopt in this Article allows for the conceptualization of data privacy
as a lever of both regulation and deregulation.
Privacy is
instrumentalized for the pursuit of traditional consumer protection
and political participation goals that stretch beyond municipal
boundaries, making cities participants in nation-wide debates of
regulation and deregulation that reverberate across the country and
may even have global implications. Rather than the enactment of
new legislation, public interest litigation — as an instance of
exercising existing city powers — plays a role in these cases.
Simultaneously, privacy can also be instrumentalized by private actors
— for example, in the sharing economy — that want to avoid
regulation of any kind. With this in mind, we consider whether
several cities, at the same moment in time, will reach different
outcomes when faced with similar policy challenges or converge on

14. See generally STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & SUSAN CRAWFORD, THE RESPONSIVE
CITY: ENGAGING COMMUNITIES THROUGH DATA-SMART GOVERNANCE (2014);
STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & NEIL KLEIMAN, A NEW CITY O/S: THE POWER OF OPEN,
COLLABORATIVE AND DISTRIBUTED GOVERNANCE (2017).
15. These include video security cameras, automatic license plate readers
(ALPRs), shot detectors, body-worn cameras, and, most recently, facial recognition
technology. See generally JAKE LAPERRUQUE, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT,
FACING
THE
FUTURE
OF
SURVEILLANCE
(2019),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/docs.pogo.org/report/2019/Facing-the-Future-of-Surveillan
ce_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/HYY8-5LKV].
16. See JACOBS, supra note 6, at 59.
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policies across the board. We question to what extent the level of
privacy protection in the city is dependent on general federal
constitutional and statutory frameworks. The Article offers tentative
answers by discussing developments in a handful of U.S., Canadian,
and European cities.
Given that privacy is a multifaceted concept, we find that the same
cities may protect certain aspects of privacy in some areas while
undermining it in others. For example, we see New York City
litigating to ban the collection of citizenship data of its population,17
yet also attempting to acquire from Airbnb, without subpoenas, the
personal data of Airbnb hosts.18 Thus, there are no privacy
frontrunners or privacy laggards. Instead, we identify two main roles
for data-rich cities: privacy activists and data stewards.
First, through data privacy activism, cities raise a voice in
nation-wide political and consumer protection debates as in the
Census 2020, Cambridge Analytica, and Equifax cases. As privacy
activists, cities assume a role most closely aligned with a traditional
public law institution acting to utilize innovation in the service of
citizens.19 Second, cities act as data stewards when they take steps to
govern a new datafied urban space.20 This role extends from pooling
data among city agencies to improve the delivery of services, to
managing data-sharing agreements with private actors in discrete
contexts (such as ride- or bike-share data), to ceding control over data
governance as an element of huge real estate development deals.21
As privacy stewards, cities may reorient the very understanding of
“public interest” from privacy protections to open data sharing
practices and behave more like commercial actors. Privacy can give
way to budgetary concerns exacerbated by federal and state
disengagement from the provision of public services, immigration
waves, and general urbanization trends. Our case studies suggest that
data stewardship is best understood on a spectrum spanning both
highly protective intracity data agreements and commercial
giveaways, with “data collaboratives” (or “data trusts”) occupying a
middle ground. Thus, cities-as-data stewards attempt to regulate their
urban environments through data, which may occur at the expense of

17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. Privacy activism is not confined to litigation. It extends as well to legislative
and regulatory activity. See Rubinstein, supra note 3, at 1966 (discussing innovative
local surveillance ordinances).
20. Strandburg, supra note 11, at 10–11.
21. See infra Section III.B.iv.
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privacy. Finally, we find that the privatization of public services is
morphing into the privatization of public spaces, as data collected in
communal areas are co-owned or co-opted by private companies.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I situates urban data
initiatives and related privacy issues in the context of federalism and
localism. Part II examines the city as a privacy activist through the
lens of the Census 2020 litigation and lawsuits against major
corporations (such as Facebook and Equifax) in which city lawyers
led consumer protection lawsuits on behalf of local residents but
acted on a national stage. Part III then examines the city as a data
steward using detailed case studies about the impact on the privacy of
data-sharing agreements among city agencies and commercial
agreements with urban innovation firms like Sidewalk Labs or sharing
economy firms like Uber or Airbnb. Part III also contrasts instances
of data governance arrangements in business-friendly environments,
specifically comparing Toronto and Barcelona’s efforts to preserve
the public interest while embracing smart city concepts. The Article
then concludes.
I. PLACING PRIVACY IN THE FEDERALISM AND LOCALISM DEBATES

This Part locates privacy and technology within a historical
overview of theorizing cities from a legal vantage point: First, it shows
how cities are slowly carved out space within American federalism
and localism debates. Second, it engages with the most developed
account of urban legal theory today — that of Professor Richard
Schragger. In the privacy field, the model advanced by Schragger
translates into an amalgam of urban privacy activism and data
stewardship, as discussed below.22 In other words, the model likely
holds true even beyond the United States, with two caveats: when
applied to big, cosmopolitan cities; and to the extent that such cities
choose to avail themselves of agglomeration effects and existing legal
powers.
A. From Federal to Local, Urban and Cosmopolitan Values

The study of big cities often falls in the cracks between federalism
and localism. Amid insightful essays on “Our Federalism,”23 “Our

22. See infra Parts II, III.
23. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1549 (2012).
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Localism,”24 and a carve-out for “Our Regionalism,”25 a take on “Our
Urbanism” is still missing.
Federalism often centers on the
relationship between the federal government and the states, while
localism examines the relationship between states and localities.
Granted, both scholarly work and constitutional doctrine recognize
overlaps. Federalism and localism coincide with the values of
decentralization: Dean Heather Gerken spells out the normative case
for federalism as promoting “choice, competition, participation,
experimentation, and the diffusion of power.”26 Professor Richard
Briffault convincingly argues that what is true for federalism is even
more true for localism, since:
[T]he [Supreme] Court’s conflation of federalism with “local”
self-governance and accountability to local electorates is
noteworthy, and many of the Court’s federalism cases actually dealt
with local governments. The Court’s normative concerns with
responsiveness to diverse needs in a heterogeneous society,
innovation and experimentation, and citizen involvement in
democratic processes apply even more to local governments than to
states.27

Professor Schragger goes a step further by demonstrating that as
large corporate interests drive state and federal policymakers to
converge around a deregulatory agenda, cities — not states — have
become the true “laboratories of democracy” in the United States,
bulwarks of diversity, and engines of normative federalism.28
Schragger persuasively argues that as economic activity in urban
centers increases, cities’ ability to experiment with redistributive and
regulatory policies is on the rise.29
State and local autonomy have a long association with a
conservative agenda, at least since the days of Jim Crow.30 Especially
in the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, however, the
24. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I — The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part
II — Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990).
25. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U. P A . L. R EV .

377 (2018).
26. Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term — Foreword: Federalism
All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2010).
27. Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1995, 2018–19 (2018).
28. Richard Schragger, Federalism, Metropolitanism, and the Problem of States,
105 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1589–91 (2019).
29. Id. at 1597.
30. See generally Jack Balkin, Federalism and the Conservative Ideology, 459
URB. LAW. 3 (1987).
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local has become the new stomping ground for progressives.
American cities have formed a sort of bottom-up opposition in a host
of policy domains, including campaign finance regulation,31
“sanctuary” for immigrants,32 environmental protection,33 and
anti-discrimination.34 Federalism and localism scholars have long
noted the trend, but what has gone under the radar is a new area of
city initiatives: data privacy.
Should what is true for all localities and all cities in general — for
example, their recently expanded capacity and willingness for
regulatory experimentation — apply a fortiori to big cities that,
thanks to a sizeable market share, are even better able to offer viable
democratic experiments across a range of policies? The role of large
U.S. cities in a federal or local constellation of actors is rarely studied
separately.35 No doubt, on these terms, New York City is no different
from Tucson, Arizona. Professor Nestor Davidson persuasively
shows that questions of legal autonomy across all localities are
essential for depolarizing conflict and planting the seeds of legal
doctrine, but emphasizes the variety of state constitutions that point
to the difficulty of a one-size-fits-all approach.36 There are a small
number of major American cities with their own legal charters —
Chicago, New York City, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington,
D.C. — that can be singled out because of their sheer size or cultural,
technological, or political leadership. We focus our study on these
31. See Vivian Wang, N.Y. Democrats Vowed to Get Big Money Out of Politics.
N.Y.
T IMES
(Nov.
22,
2018),
Big
Money
Interfere?,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/22/nyregion/campaign-finance-reform-new-york.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/3NHR-FBPS] (referring to New York City’s approved ballot
proposal to lower contribution limits for city races and increase the city’s matching
funds for candidates).
32. See generally Christopher Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 59
B.C. L. REV. 1703 (2018) (presenting a comprehensive overview of sanctuary policies
on the state and city level).
33. See generally Sarah Holder, One Year After Trump Left the Paris
Agreement,
Who’s
Still
In?,
C ITY L AB
(June
1,
2018),
https://www.citylab.com/environment/2018/06/one-year-after-trump-left-the-paris-agr
eement-whos-still-in/561674/ [https://perma.cc/3TCK-M9XY] (discussing funding
initiatives for American cities’ environmental pledge).
34. Cities and Counties with Non-Discrimination Ordinances that Include Gender
Identity,
HUM.
RTS.
CAMPAIGN,
https://www.hrc.org/resources/cities-and-counties-with-non-discrimination-ordinances
-that-include-gender [https://perma.cc/U5WP-EJAY] (last visited Dec. 23, 2019)
(listing cities and counties that prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of
gender identity by public and private employers).
35. Frug and Barron are the exceptions. See supra note 2.
36. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of
Polarization, 128 YALE L.J. 4 (2019).

Will
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cosmopolitan cities.37 In seeking to understand the privacy aspects of
“Our Urbanism,” however, it also makes sense to add to the analysis
a snapshot of medium-size and smaller cities located in the interior of
the country.
Further, we attempt to place the U.S. developments within a global
perspective by discussing a few foreign cities that have undertaken
important smart city and data stewardship experiments — namely,
Toronto and Barcelona.38 The cosmopolitan ambitions of diverse and
populous urban centers, like Canada’s Toronto, are comparable to
those of New York City. In contrast, Barcelona, Spain — a
middle-sized city in Europe that struggles for a cosmopolitan flavor
— provides an example of an alternative vision of the public sector’s
engagement with technology firms. Moreover, a federalist and
localist framing remains apt for these cities since Toronto is
embedded within a federal system, while Barcelona is a part of
Spain’s highly decentralized government.
The capacity of big cities for experimentation is arguably stronger
than that of smaller cities since, as Schragger points out,
agglomeration effects limit the fear of capital flight.39 He challenges
the view of competitive federalists who explain urban ethos with
simple convergence around a single deregulatory agenda: in the latter
view, cities competing to attract businesses and skilled workers will
offer different deregulatory bundles lest capital and skilled labor
decide to “vote with their feet” and go elsewhere due to more
Instead of sorting, Schragger posits
favorable conditions.40
agglomeration as central to urban policy initiatives. In his model,

37. See infra Parts II, III. For the first foray of the notion of a global city in the
academic debate, see generally SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY (1991). Defining
cosmopolitanism is not an easy task. See, e.g., KWAME APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM:
ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS (2007); ULRICH BECK, COSMOPOLITAN VISION
(2006). In the context of our study, the cosmopolitan can be broadly linked to city
communities of diverse, often immigrant populations that in spite of racial, religious,
or other differences try to arrive at a common understanding of the good life,
including on the place of technology, innovation, and privacy in it. In a similar vein,
Jeremy Waldron suggests that the “cosmopolitan” can be understood as an attitude,
lifestyle, and a way of constructing an identity for oneself that is different from
devotion or immersion in a particular culture. See generally Jeremy Waldron, What
Is Cosmopolitan?, 8 J. POL. PHIL. 227 (2002). A related idea is cosmopolitan
citizenship and the construction of a community based on shared values. See Sandel,
supra note 10, at 145.
38. See infra Section III.B.iv, Part IV.
39. Schragger, supra note 28, at 1557.
40. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416 (1956). Although the phrase has been ascribed to Tiebout, he never
actually used that wording in his work.
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what matters for businesses and skilled workers is access to the right
places with the right people — agglomeration results in restricted
capital and labor mobility, unlocking, in turn, the potential for
democratic experiments on the local level. 41
We observe that in the technology arena, Schragger’s model may
shed more light on urban data initiatives in bigger rather than
middle-sized cities. For example, in Louisville, Kentucky, despite the
city advancing legal changes at Google’s behest to facilitate the
installation of Google’s high-speed internet service, the company
recently pulled out of the medium-sized city.42 Conversely, despite
protests and a pending privacy lawsuit, Sidewalk Labs continued to
move ahead on its Quayside smart city project in the larger city of
Toronto until the economic uncertainty resulting from the
COVID-19 pandemic led the firm to withdraw from the project.43
However, the sphere for experimentation that agglomeration opens
up for cities is circumscribed by both federal and state law factors
such as a general lack of constitutional status for U.S. cities and the
very broad ability of states to preempt local laws and policy
initiatives.44 Schragger strongly emphasizes the lasting shift from
rural to urban in American demographics that has yet to be
encapsulated in law and power distribution.45 Recently, academic
discussions of both federalists and localists zoom in on aggressive new
preemption measures enacted in the United States primarily by red
states that target blue cities’ regulatory experiments.46 In the data
privacy field, however, U.S. cities have fared somewhat better and
have successfully regulated both city agency data collection and the

41. Schragger, supra note 28, at 1549–50.
42. Chris Welch, Google Fiber Is Leaving Louisville in Humiliating Setback,
VERGE
(Feb.
7,
2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/7/18215743/google-fiber-leaving-louisville-service-e
nding [https://perma.cc/G9N9-BCJD].
43. See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
44. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 289–90, 327–28 (8th ed. 2016) (unpacking the
U.S. Supreme Court’s doctrine that cities are creatures of their states). For a
Canadian equivalent — treating cities as creatures of their provinces — see the 1997
decision of the Ontario Superior Court in East York v. Ontario (Att’y Gen.) (1997),
34 O.R. 3d 789 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.)
45. Richard Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163,
1166–68 (2018) (arguing that the equal representation of states in the Senate
privileges less populous rural areas over densely populated cities, and so do
gerrymandering and state and congressional districting).
46. Id.; see also Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption, Federalism, and Local
Democracy, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 133, 136–37 (2017). See generally Davidson,
supra note 36.
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purchase and use of surveillance technologies.47 In fact, cities possess
the legal power to do so, and relevant state laws do not preempt them
due to what one of the co-authors has described elsewhere as the Fair
Information Practice Principles’ (FIPPs) gap (meaning that the
federal Privacy Act and its state analogs only apply to data collection
and use by federal and state agencies, but not by local ones) and the
public surveillance gap (meaning that federal surveillance law
typically does not limit surveillance in public spaces and city
surveillance ordinances have filled in this gap).48
Privacy regulation of the commercial sector is more complicated as
the sectoral approach to privacy in U.S. law would mean that
localities would need to navigate around federal law governing entire
sectors such as credit, healthcare, and finance.49 Commercial privacy
regulation is attempted by a few states — notably in California
through the newly enacted California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA), which went into force in 2020.50 The statute is expected to
be influential well beyond Californian borders51 and is already being
discussed in congressional hearings that consider proposals for a U.S.
federal consumer privacy bill.52 The CCPA explicitly preempts “all
rules, regulations, codes, ordinances, and other laws” adopted at the
local level “regarding the collection and sale of consumers’ personal
information by a business.”53 Thus, local commercial privacy
regulation represents another potential gap for local privacy law but a
harder one to fill by cities — instead, several U.S. cities have
attempted a case-by-case quasi-regulation of the private sector
through initiating lawsuits against private companies that mishandle

47. See Rubinstein, supra note 3, at 2035.
48. Id. at 1974–79.
49. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2011); Gramm–
Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. § 6803 (2012); Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act Regulations (HIPAA), 45 C.F.R. pt. 164 (2012).
50. California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.175 (2019).
51. Many other U.S. states have introduced bills regulating commercial
(consumer) privacy — in 2019 alone, 25 states and Puerto Rico introduced or filed
such bills. See Anupam Chander et al., Catalyzing Privacy Law 30 (Univ. of Colo.
Law Sch., Working Paper No. 19-25, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3433922
[https://perma.cc/D9TQ-UGE5] (arguing that many of the state bills closely resemble
the CCPA).
52. See GDPR and CCPA: Opt-ins, Consumer Control, and the Impact on
Commerce and Innovation Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong.
(2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/gdpr-and-ccpa-opt-ins-consumercontrol-and-the-impact-on-competition-and-innovation
[https://perma.cc/6A35-YKCU].
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.180.
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data under state and city consumer protection laws. Despite the
controversy in federalist debates over what constitutes the “local,”54
in order to be regulated effectively (in subsidiarity parlance),55 the
credit and finance sectors arguably need national (and perhaps even
an international threshold) regulation. In both Spain and Canada,
unlike in the United States, a comprehensive statutory framework
already regulates commercial privacy at the European level in the
European Union (the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR))56 and the federal level in Canada (the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)).57
In sum, U.S. cities’ legal powers in the field of privacy are
substantial within a few narrow areas. However, in the mismatch
between cosmopolitan and other cities’ rising economic and societal
importance and constrains on their legal and fiscal autonomy — a
discrepancy lamented at least since Gerald Frug published his seminal
work City Making58 — preemption is but one aspect on the scale of
city power versus powerlessness. Granted, major blue cities in large,
blue states in the United States might be seen as the bulwarks of
This is because the preemption of
progressive federalism.59
regulation on the state level, although it does occur,60 is far less
disruptive than the overreaching preemption enacted by red states
against blue localities that stretches to punitive measures.61 However,

54. Briffault, supra note 27, at 2020–21 (showing, for example, that gun violence
has a local dimension insofar as it impacts local services such as hospitals or that
through the management of waste disposal, local governments become sensitized
about nonbiodegradable products addressing the “ostensibly nonlocal problem of
climate change”).
55. For the most articulate legal incarnation of the principle of subsidiarity, see
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 5,
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326) 1; see also Yishai Blanc, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and
the Role of Local Governments in the Age of Global Multilevel Governance, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 531–32 (2010).
56. General Data Protection Regulation, 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119).
57. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000,
ch. 5 (Can.).
58. See generally GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES
WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (2001).
59. Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, D EMOCRACY 38 (2012).
60. See Schragger, supra note 28, at 1566.
61. RICHARD BRIFFAULT ET AL., AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY,
THE TROUBLING TURN IN STATE PREEMPTION: THE ASSAULT ON PROGRESSIVE
CITIES
AND
HOW
CITIES
CAN
RESPOND
1
(2017),
https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ACS_Issue_Brief_-_Preemption_
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/HH8Y-E84A] (“States have adopted statutes that threaten to
withhold funding and expose cities to private liability in preemption conflicts as well
as enacted laws that seek to impose personal civil penalties — and in some instances,
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these major blue cities might also face disempowerment based on
fiscal constraints.
B. Cosmopolitan Ambitions versus (Fiscal) Autonomy

In terms of economic power, not only are cosmopolitan cities
responsible for a significant percentage of revenue and taxes in their
respective states and the national economy as a whole, but their gross
metropolitan product may exceed that of many states.62 That said,
perhaps as a result of municipal giveaways to railroad interests and
overspending on other forms of infrastructure in the past, many U.S.
states have circumscribed metropolitan revenue-raising even in their
largest cities.
Dillon’s rule — the doctrine restricting local
governments’ law-making authority only to explicit grants of such
power by the state — emerged in the United States and spread
Further,
throughout Canada amidst various fiscal concerns.63
progressive reformers of the past century sought to “limit the capacity
for [city] governments to take on debt by entrenching debt limitations
into state constitutions.”64 The European context is somewhat
comparable: European Union-wide austerity measures following the
European debt crisis in 2009 led Spain to reverse its prior Keynesian
approach resulting in cutbacks on local fiscal autonomy and the
enactment of legal measures aimed at general recentralization after
2010.65 Although most U.S. states have long since replaced Dillon’s
rule with a broader mandate for local autonomy under home rule,66
and Canadian cities emancipated themselves around 2005 to obtain

even potential criminal liability — on mayors, city council members, police chiefs and
other local officials who defy state legislation.”).
62. See U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS & COUNCIL ON METRO ECONS, U.S. METRO
ECONOMIES: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FULL EMPLOYMENT, ANNUAL GMP REPORT
(2018); Schragger, supra note 45, at 1168 (“Cities and their wider metropolitan areas
now contain the bulk of the American population and are the primary economic
drivers of their states, their regions, and the nation.”).
63. See Ron Levi & Mariana Valverde, Freedom of the City: Canadian Cities and
the Quest for Governmental Status, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 410, 415–16 (2006)
(detailing the origins and spread of Dillon’s rule to Canada).
64. Schragger, supra note 28.
65. Carmen Navarro & Esther Pano, Spanish Local Government and the
Austerity Plan: In the Eye of the Perfect Storm, in LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES IN TIMES
OF AUSTERITY ACROSS MEDITERRANEAN EUROPE 100 (Andrea Lippi & Theodore
Tsekos eds., 2019) (discussing a correlation between recentralization and austerity in
the aftermath of the Euro-crisis in Spain).
66. Briffault, supra note 27, at 2011 (describing the home rule as the commitment
to local law-making capacity, codified in the constitutions and statutes of the vast
majority of states).
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certain concessions of autonomy from their provinces,67 remnants of
Dillon’s Rule persist in North America in terms of fiscal restraints on
local governments. New York, for example, limits the amount raised
by taxes on real estate in New York City in any fiscal year to 2.5% of
the average full valuation.68 Similarly, the pendulum has swung back
in Spain, where in 2019, the center-left Prime Minister proposed
substantial increases in public spending for the region of Catalonia
(where Barcelona is located). However, the measure was not
approved as Catalonians saw it as an insufficient grant of fiscal
autonomy.69
Cities worldwide are experiencing similar problems. A central
issue is described as “offloading” — an abdication of responsibility on
the side of state or federal/central governments from the provision of
urban infrastructure coupled with the reduction in federal or state
grants for urban centers.70 Cities are expected to fill in the gap while
demands for infrastructure updates and the need for new services are
constantly on the rise due to rapid population growth and
immigration.
In addition to challenges in the availability of
affordable housing, poverty levels, traffic congestion, and other
transit problems, cities now face new challenges brought by the digital
revolution, such as closing the digital divide and boosting urban
information infrastructure. Privacy considerations are intrinsically
linked to the agglomeration of data, including personally identifiable
data, on the local level. Local governments amass data not only as a
result of providing the usual municipal services to local citizens
(transportation, housing, sanitation, education and libraries, health
and social services, and public safety) but also due to their growing
embrace of data-driven products and services. Cities worldwide
attempt to transform themselves by taking advantage of data
analytics, social engagement, and big data.71 The digital revolution
has led to urban investments in information technology (IT)
infrastructure as never before with the dual goals of enhancing and
improving municipal services (especially social services and

67. Levi & Valverde, supra note 63, at 415–30.
68. Schragger, supra note 45, at 1179.
69. Omar G. Encarnación, Will Spain Become a Victim of the Catalan
Separatists?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
25,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/opinion/spain-catalonia-election.html
[https://perma.cc/APB3-UHLV].
70. See generally Levi & Valverde, supra note 63.
71. See generally GOLDSMITH & KLEIMAN, supra note 14.
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policing)72 and ensuring greater access to technology through
broadband initiatives and investments in the local technology
workforce.73 Local financial dependence on private investment to
create and maintain such infrastructure results in a special symbiosis
with businesses that arguably delineates the outer boundaries of
regulatory experimentation on the city level. Local governments can
seek to circumvent debt and taxing limitations in many ways,
including through licensing and fees. Related to privacy, we see that
some cities require data (including personally identifiable
information) instead of fees for licensing data-intense services such as
ride- or home-share companies like Uber and Airbnb.74 It is difficult
to find direct causation between low levels of fiscal autonomy and
attempts for “data regulation” instead of direct taxation. It is safe to
say, however, that cities worldwide are facing general legal and fiscal
constraints relative to their elevated societal and economic status and
new responsibilities. Such constraints may dictate decisions cities take
to enter into legal arrangements that are favorable to private
companies but damaging to privacy.
Even so, cities are left with plenty of legal ammunition in the
privacy field. As in the case of land use planning in the United States,
the question is not whether a city has power, but how it chooses to
exercise its extensive power. As cities experiment with data-driven
services, they are not forced into making concessions to tech giants
but may do so simply by agreeing to commercial terms that outsource
public functions or disfavor privacy as a matter of choice. One
example is New York City’s obtaining “free” (i.e., ad-funded)
technology and telecommunications services for local citizens in the
aforementioned “LinkNYC” deal with Sidewalk Labs,75 or requiring
non-anonymized data from Airbnb to enforce city housing
regulations without imposing tax burdens.76 Another is Toronto’s
decision to outsource the development and management of a parcel
on its waterfront to Sidewalk Labs without fully addressing the
privacy implications of the deal despite the existence, in Canada, of
solid federal and provincial privacy laws that Toronto could have

72. See Rubinstein, supra note 3, at 1964–65. See generally ANDREW FERGUSON,
THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT (2017).
73. See generally infra Part III.
74. See infra Sections III.B.i–ii.
75. See infra Section III.B.i.
76. See infra Section III.B.ii.
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used as leverage in their negotiations.77 This decision was in keeping
with Toronto’s initial disregard of the long-term impact of the deal on
the city’s autonomy vis-à-vis a powerful tech company. Such data
deals are cut without sufficient deliberation about whether local
residents truly wish to exchange privacy and public control over
public places for the promise of improved efficiency and greater
convenience.78
The symbiosis between city governments and tech companies is
mirroring, on the subnational level, the important transformation of
law and legal standards that Julie Cohen compellingly traces on the
As both businesses and governmental
supra-national level.79
institutions transition from industrial to data-intense, informational
capitalist models, U.S. cities exemplify that transition: they function
as a hybrid between a public institution seeking to act in the public
interest and a business corporation seeking to maximize profits.
Interestingly, this trend — that we coin as “data stewardship” —
co-exists with cities’ public litigation efforts that promote privacy — a
trend that we call “privacy activism.” Public lawyers typically defend
their governmental clients when litigation is initiated against them.
Yet, as pointed out by the City Attorney of San Francisco,80 lawyers
in a city’s law department can also act as civil plaintiffs invoking
federal, state, and city law in the public interest. Data activism is an
example of just how cities make use of existing powers to expand
their sphere of policy experimentation.

77. See infra Section III.B.iv.
78. See Susan Crawford, Beware of Google’s Intentions, WIRED (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/sidewalk-labs-toronto-google-risks/
[https://perma.cc/GB9S-5D4X] (stating that “it is not clear whether Toronto will gain
any useful insights from its partnership with Google. Meanwhile, Google will be
gaining insights about urban life including energy use, transit effectiveness, climate
mitigation strategies, and social service delivery patterns — that it will then be able to
resell to cities around the world. Including, perhaps, Toronto itself.”).
79. See generally JULIE COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (2019). See also SHOSHANA
ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019).
80. JILL HABIG ET AL., LOCAL ACTION, NATIONAL IMPACT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO
AFFIRMATIVE LITIGATION FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 4 (2019),
https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/A-Practical-Guide-to-Affi
rmative-Litigation-FINAL-4.13.19-1.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3QB-jbCANH4rTK5jGE36vF
gqEZOEnhPBrk237Z_1nBnkGAcmTx_932bLA [https://perma.cc/NX5V-J4DP].
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II. THE CITY AS PRIVACY ACTIVIST

Some of the big, cosmopolitan cities we examine have been active
in trying to safeguard privacy-as-political participation in an issue
with national ramifications: the 2020 Census citizenship litigation.
Others have initiated lawsuits against major firms like Facebook and
Equifax for privacy violations affecting local residents. This Part
examines cities as privacy activists in both sets of cases.
A. Data Wars: Privacy and Political Participation

Data is power. By trying to protect the personal information of
their immigrant populations, states and cities are trying to safeguard
local autonomy and ensure political participation. As Professor Ilya
Somin remarks: “State and local governments have extensive
information about hundreds of millions of people that the federal
government could abuse in many ways.”81 Such abuse of data could
stifle federalism’s institutional structure for allowing minorities to
take part in governance, what Heather Gerken has called “the loyal
opposition.”82 Urban power measured in political representation and
the disbursement of state and federal funds depends on cities’
population size. But urban population size often correlates with
diversity. In terms of demographics, global cities like New York, San
Francisco, Chicago, Seattle, and Washington, D.C. are homes to very
diverse populations, many of whom are immigrants such that lack of
privacy about their legal status may result in severe consequences
including deportation proceedings.83 Urban power can, therefore, be
indirectly connected to policies favoring the preservation of the data
privacy of these vulnerable populations.
In May 2017, President Trump established the (now defunct)
Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity.84 The
Commission was supposed to collect a large pool of voter’s personal

81. Ilya Somin, Making Federalism Great Again: How the Trump
Administration’s Attack on Sanctuary Cities Unintentionally Strengthened Judicial
Protection for State Autonomy, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1248, 1283 (2019) [hereinafter
Somin, Making Federalism Great Again].
82. Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958, 1960 (2014).
83. See generally Anil Kahan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications
of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137 (2008).
84. Charles Steward III, Trump’s Controversial Election Integrity’s Commission
Is Gone. Here’s What Comes Next, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2018),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/01/04/trumps-controver
sial-election-integrity-commission-is-gone-heres-what-comes-next/
[https://perma.cc/TE8E-75AX].
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data from election officials in states, including names, addresses, dates
of birth, political affiliations, voter histories, criminal records, military
status, and partial social security numbers.85 The government’s
purported justification — to fight voter fraud via access to state voter
registration databases — was seen by many as an ill-masked attempt
Forty-four states, including many
to restrict voting rights.86
Republican-led state governments, and the District of Columbia,
invoked privacy, among other reasons, to reject some or all of the
government’s demands.87 Many of the opposing states filed lawsuits,
and civil society organizations also initiated legal actions on privacy
grounds under federal law.88 Finally, the government decided to
discontinue the existence of the Commission, citing state resistance
and its choice to not “engage in endless legal battles” — battles that
commentators indicated the administration probably expected to
lose.89 The Election Integrity Commission episode throws in sharp
relief the connection between data and power on the one hand, and
privacy and local autonomy on the other.
More recently, the Trump Administration’s crackdown on
immigration has been countered by local efforts to oppose the federal
government’s deportation of undocumented immigrants.90 In turn,
the federal government has fought back not only by directly
challenging sanctuary cities but also by leveraging new data wars that
threaten to curtail local autonomy significantly.91 We argue that the
Census 2020 litigation, in which states and cities were the first to file a
case against the Department of Commerce’s decision to insert a

85. Id.; see also Letter from Kris W. Kobach, Vice Chair, Presidential Advisory
Comm’n on Election Integrity, to Hon. Matt Dunlap, Sec’y of State (June 28, 2017),
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/06/30/peic.letter.to.maine%5b2%5d.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ENZ2-WZHA].
86. Fresh Air: Trump’s Election Integrity Commission Could Have A ‘Chilling
Effect’ On Voting Rights, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 17, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/05/17/528769195/trumps-election-integrity-commission-coul
d-have-a-chilling-effect-on-voting-righ [https://perma.cc/MT43-8QSN].
87. Ilya Somin, Demise of Trump Voter Fraud Commission Is a Victory for
Federalism,
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Jan.
4,
2018),
https://reason.com/2018/01/04/demise-of-trump-voter-fraud-commission-i/
[https://perma.cc/382Y-MZKM].
88. The first case filed by a civil society organization was a suit brought in
Washington, D.C. by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). See EPIC v.
Presidential Election Commission, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
https://epic.org/privacy/litigation/voter/epic-v-commission/
[https://perma.cc/25Y6-BW3J] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
89. Somin, supra note 87, at 2.
90. See Somin, Making Federalism Great Again, supra note 81, at 1247–48.
91. See infra Section II.A.i.
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citizenship question in the 2020 census, is best understood against the
backdrop of the administration’s attempts to discipline sanctuary
jurisdictions.

i. The Census 2020 Citizenship Question Through the Prism of
Sanctuary Cities
In 2017, California declared itself “a sanctuary state.” As a part of
its sanctuary policies, the state enacted Senate Bill 54, restricting the
range of information state and local governments are allowed to share
with federal immigration enforcers,92 and Assembly Bill 450,
prohibiting employers from voluntarily allowing a federal
immigration enforcement agent to enter “nonpublic” areas of their
workplaces or to access, review, or obtain employees’ records.93 In
response, the Trump Administration sought to aggressively enforce 8
U.S.C. Section 1373, a federal law mandating that a federal, state, or
local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way
restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or
receiving from, the (former) Immigration and Naturalization Service
information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or
unlawful, of any individual.94 Section 1373 predates the Trump
Administration by decades and has been the subject of prior
federalism challenges by some of the jurisdictions involved in the
citizenship imbroglio.95 The novelty of the Trump Administration’s
effort is to legally tie federal enforcement to punitive measures,
thereby turning Section 1373 into a grant condition for federal
funding of local governments.96 The Trump Administration also
evoked Section 1373 to challenge the legality of California’s sanctuary
laws; litigation is ongoing.97 The case has been framed as one about

92. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7284.6(a)(1)(C)–(D) (2018).
93. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7285.1–2 (2018).
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1996).
95. See City of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (the City
relied on Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997), but the Tenth Circuit
distinguished the cases). In an earlier case, Sturgeon v. Brathon, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718
(2009), California litigated against Section 1373. See also Bill Ong Hing, Immigration

Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative of Good Policing and Good
Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247, 263 (2012).
96. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017); see also Somin,
Making Federalism Great Again, supra note 81, at 1248.
97. See United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2018)

(interpreting Section 1373 narrowly to avoid conflict with California’s Senate Bill 54).
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local enforcement of immigration law and federalism.98 However,
these issues closely intersect with privacy, given that the challenged
laws attempt to safeguard the personal information of California’s
immigrant population.
Many California cities (including San
Francisco) have sided with the state sanctuary policies based on a
narrower interpretation of Section 1373.99
Several of the cities examined in this Article (New York City,
Seattle, San Francisco, and Chicago) have litigated on their own or
joined a coalition of states against the government’s mandate of
cooperation in deporting illegal immigrants as a condition of receiving
federal grants to localities.100 The Census 2020 litigation, in which
many sanctuary cities have taken part, is not directly about
federalism, much like the sanctuary cities’ litigation is not directly
about the protection of personal information. No matter the legal
framing, however, the context of the litigation in the Census 2020
cases reveals a pattern: for local autonomy to exist, the privacy of
national minorities who make up the majority in big urban centers
needs to be preserved.

ii. The Census 2020 Litigation in Focus101
The U.S. Constitution explicitly mandates the government to
conduct a census every ten years.102 The federal government collects
census data on all persons residing in the United States, regardless of
their legal status, to apportion state representatives to the House of
Representatives, to draw political districts and allocate power to
them, as well as to allocate hundreds of billions of dollars in federal,
state, and local funds.103 Simultaneously, census data is used for

98. See Somin, Making Federalism Great Again, supra note 81, at 1252 (arguing
that Section 1373 might violate the Tenth Amendment, which has been interpreted,
according to established precedents that go back to Printz, to bar federal
“commandeering” of state and local governments).
99. Steinle v. City & County of San Francisco, 230 F. Supp. 3d 994, 1006 (N.D.
Cal. 2017).
100. Somin, Making Federalism Great Again, supra note 81, at 1259–60.
101. This Section builds on Marc Rotenberg & Bilyana Petkova, U.S. Supreme

Court Blocks Citizenship Question on 2020 US Census, Trump Issues Executive
Order to Collect Citizenship Data, 5 EUR. DATA PROTECTION L. REV. 453 (2019).

102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
103. See Counting for Dollars 2020: The Role of the Decennial Census in the
Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds, GEO. WASH. INST. PUB. POL’Y (Feb. 10,
2020),
https://gwipp.gwu.edu/counting-dollars-2020-role-decennial-censusgeographic-distribution-federal-funds [https://perma.cc/F2Q3-V8RK].
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demographic purposes and has habitually included respondents’ race,
sex, age, and whether they own or rent a home.104
Since 1960, the decennial census questionnaire distributed to all
households . . . has excluded a question on citizenship . . . . The
Census Bureau has stated that to ask this question increases the
difficulty of counting already “hard-to-count” groups — particularly
non-citizens and Hispanics — whose members would be less willing
to participate for fear that their data could be used against them.105

In March 2018, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross announced
that he would add the citizenship question to the Census for 2020 to
assist the Department of Justice (DOJ) in enforcing the Voting
Rights Act (VRA).106 Various plaintiffs challenged the decision in
court.107 The plaintiffs included a coalition of 15 states and a number
of cities and counties as well as non-governmental organizations that
support immigrants.108 They raised two challenges: first, that the
decision violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which
prohibits federal agencies from acting in an arbitrary manner; second,
that the decision violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because it was motivated in part by invidious
discrimination against immigrant communities of color.109

104. See Beth Jarosz & Paola Scommegna, Why Are They Asking That? What
Everyone Needs to Know About 2020 Census Questions, POPULATION REFERENCE

BUREAU
(Aug.
13,
2019),
https://www.prb.org/why-are-they-asking-that-what-everyone-needs-to-know-about-2
020-census-questions/ [https://perma.cc/5FU9-XPYR]; Issie Lapowsky, The
Challenges of America’s First Online Census, WIRED (Feb. 6, 2019 12:07 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/us-census-2020-goes-digital/
[https://perma.cc/6XVW-L6EM]; Kim Parker et al., Chapter 1: Race and Multiracial
Americans in the U.S. Census, PEW RES. CTR. (June 11, 2015),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/06/11/chapter-1-race-and-multiracial-americans
-in-the-u-s-census/ [https://perma.cc/DG5C-KYMX].
105. Bilyana Petkova, Citizenship Data Wars, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (July 24,
2019),
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2019/07/citizenship-data-wars
[https://perma.cc/2PWC-RWXA].
106. Salvador Rizzo, The Four Pinocchio Claim at the Center of the Census
Citizenship Question, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2019, 3:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/22/four-pinocchio-claim-center-cens
us-citizenship-question/ [https://perma.cc/GA9P-8MZW].
107. See id.
108. Hansi Lo Wong, 15 States Say Unauthorized Immigrants Should Continue to
Count for Seats in Congress, NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 6, 2019 8:45 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/09/06/754685703/15-states-say-unauthorized-immigrants-sh
ould-continue-to-count-for-seats-in-cong [https://perma.cc/8ZYQ-KTHT].
109. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 315 F. Supp. 3d 766, 773 (S.D.N.Y.
2018).
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Writing for the district court, Judge Furman sided with the
plaintiffs, finding that an undercount would translate into a loss of
political power and funds for states and localities.110 The court also
found that, in states with large migrant populations (like California
and New York), an undercount might result in both the loss of a
congressional seat111 and dilution of the political power of certain
cities within their states.112 In addition, since national census data is
also used for a range of municipal purposes, the court accepted as an
injury, in fact, New York City’s and Chicago’s argument for a
diversion of resources to counteract the potentially harmful effects of
data distortion that inserting a citizenship question to the census
might cause.113 Finally, the court found that the government’s stated
rationale for restoring the citizenship question — to promote
enforcement of the VRA — was pretextual and thus violated the
APA.114 But, the court rejected the claim that the Secretary of
Commerce was motivated by invidious discrimination in violation of
the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause.115 The
government then appealed the decision directly to the Supreme
Court.116
In a long and divided opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts,
the Court left in place the injunction blocking the citizenship question
from the 2020 Census.117 Chief Justice Roberts was satisfied with the
evidence showing that the reluctance of noncitizen households’ to
answer the citizenship question would depress census data.118 This, in

110. Somin, Making Federalism Great Again, supra note 81, at 1248.
111. Emily Badger, A Census Question That Could Change How Power Is Divided
in
America,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
31,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/upshot/Census-question-citizenship-power.html
[https://perma.cc/7XEH-66DQ]. In California, the decision not to litigate was
possibly motivated by an interstate split between sanctuary and non-sanctuary cities.
See generally Rose Cuison Villazor & Prateepan Gulasekaram, The New Sanctuary
and Anti-Sanctuary Movements, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 549 (2018).
112. As the court explained, this problem arises for cities that are home to a
disproportionate share of their states’ noncitizen populations. U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 789; New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F.
Supp. 3d 502, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). New York City, for example, “contains
approximately forty-three percent of the total state population, but approximately
seventy-one percent of the state’s noncitizen population.” U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,
351 F. Supp. 3d at 595.
113. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 603.
114. Id. at 635.
115. Id. at 671.
116. U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2565 (2019).
117. See generally id.
118. Id. at 2565–66.
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turn, would result in a number of injuries — diminishment of political
representation, loss of federal funds, overall degradation of census
data, and diversion of resources — satisfying the “injury in fact”
standing requirement.119 However, the Chief Justice concluded that
the Secretary of Commerce was within his discretion to weigh the
benefits of completeness and accuracy of census data in favor of
completeness and against the recommendation of the Census
Bureau.120 Contrary to what the district court found, uncertainty
about the reasons behind underreporting was not unjustified, and the
Secretary of Commerce’s policymaking discretion did not need to be
subordinated to the technocratic expertise of the Bureau. In other
words, the Chief Justice found that inserting a citizenship question in
the census was a policy choice within the range of reasonable options
before the Secretary of Commerce.121 Despite this partial reversal of
the District Court’s judgment, the Chief Justice finally affirmed Judge
Furman’s opinion by stating that there was a “significant mismatch
between the decision the Secretary made and the rationale he
provided.”122
If the Trump Administration succeeds in its anti-sanctuary
measures, it will assert broad power to impose new conditions on
federal grants to state and local governments, thereby suppressing
political dissent in these jurisdictions. It is worth questioning the
Administration’s attempt to achieve the same goal — disempowering
its state and city political opponents — by waging data wars.
Approximately two weeks after the Supreme Court decision in the
census case, President Trump issued an Executive Order establishing
“an interagency working group with a goal of making available to the
Department administrative records showing citizenship data for 100
percent of the population.”123 The new rationale for this extensive
data collection is the identification of those who are eligible for public
benefits. The Executive Order continues, “data identifying citizens
will help the Federal Government generate a more reliable count of
the unauthorized alien population in the country.”124 A subsequent
statement describes a recent “massive influx of illegal immigrants at
our southern border,” states that “hundreds of thousands of aliens
who entered the country illegally have been released into the interior

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 2565.
Id. at 2570–71.
Id. at 2565.
Id. at 2575.
Exec. Order 13,880, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,821 (July 16, 2019).
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of the United States pending the outcome of their removal
proceeding,” and warns that “more than 1 million illegal aliens who
have been issued final removal orders from immigration judges . . .
remain at-large in the United States.”125
There is a limited constitutional right to information privacy in the
United States,126 and privacy injuries are often insufficient to show
standing, let alone sustain a substantive claim.127 The unresolved
constitutional crossover between privacy and antidiscrimination law
has a long pedigree that goes back to at least Roe v. Wade128 and
Lawrence v. Texas.129 Moreover, although the substantive due
process might have been eschewed for extracting a right to bodily
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut due to its Lochner-era
connotations,130 due process has resurfaced in relation to information
privacy and anti-discrimination concerns in the context of big data.131
As Justice Breyer wrote in his concurring opinion on the citizenship
question, studies by the Census Bureau found that “Hispanics were
significantly more likely than were non-Hispanics to stop answering at
the point they reached the citizenship question.”132
In substance, the Census 2020 litigation is about making available
the personal information of vulnerable immigrant populations
concentrated in big urban centers to the federal government. The gap
in constitutional protection led the justices to decide the case only on
administrative law grounds under the APA. That said, the lower
court ruling and the Roberts opinion emphasized that the violation of
the APA alone was substantial, given the statutory protection of core
constitutional and democratic values of accountability.133 President
Trump’s Executive Order appears to contemplate the collection of
personal data concerning citizenship status for statistical purposes,
and the use of citizenship data for determinations about public

125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate & Beth E. Cate, The Supreme Court and Information
Privacy, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 255, 258 (2012).
127. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW
807–08 (6th ed. 2017).
128. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
129. 539 U.S. 588 (2003).
130. See 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102
H ARV . L. R EV . 737, 744–45 (1989).
131. Jason Schultz & Kate Crawford, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 99–100 (2014).
132. U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2588 (2019).
133. Id. at 2575; New York v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 333 F. Supp. 3d
282, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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benefits and possible deportation.134 It, therefore, seems possible that
the census case may return to the Supreme Court to determine again
whether the decision to collect data about citizenship is a renewed
“contrivance,”135 similar to those evoking election fraud and the
enforcement of the VRA.136
B. City Attorneys General as Data Privacy Enforcers

Cities have litigated against the federal government to preserve the
personal information of city dwellers and safeguard diversity, local
autonomy, and political participation. They have also fought to
protect the public interest against private parties that violate the
privacy of their residents. Although state attorneys general (AGs)
have a proven track record in privacy enforcement,137 city AGs are
emerging now as new players at the forefront of consumer privacy
enforcement. States have their own versions of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTCA),138 as well as other privacy and consumer
protection laws that city AGs can invoke in court either directly or
under municipal law. Often, a state’s mini-FTCA and related privacy
statutes are worded more broadly than their federal counterparts. In
addition, the FTC has no immediate fining authority (unless a firm
violates the terms of a consent decree), whereas state law permits city
AGs to directly claim (not insignificant) civil penalties.139
The cases discussed below are among the first instances in which
city AGs use state consumer protection legislation for privacy
protection. Importantly, such suits can proceed even if the violating

134. On the same day that the President issued the Executive Order, The New
York Times reported that Immigration and Customs Enforcement would renew

“[n]ationwide raids to arrest thousands of members of undocumented families.”
Caitlin Dickerson & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Thousands Are Targeted as ICE
Prepares to Raid Undocumented Migrant Families, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/us/politics/ice-families-deport.html
[https://perma.cc/93LK-2FPB]. According to the Times, the “operation, backed by
President Trump, had been postponed, partly because of resistance among officials at
his own immigration agency.” Id.
135. Rotenberg & Petkova, supra note 101, at 457.
136. See supra Section II.A.
137. See Bilyana Petkova, The Safeguards of Privacy Federalism, 20 L EWIS &
C LARK L. R EV . 595, 619–23 (2016). See generally Danielle K. Citron, The Privacy
Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 N OTRE D AME L. R EV . 747 (2016). In
the case of Washington, D.C., the state and city attorney are the same.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012) (prohibiting unfair or deceptive practices in or affecting
commerce).
139. Id.
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conduct of an online platform or data broker has not taken place
beyond the limits of a city’s litigation jurisdiction.

i. District of Columbia v. Facebook
Facebook has a decade-long track record of privacy failures, but
the recent Cambridge Analytica scandal tops them all.140 As widely
reported in the press,141 Facebook allowed a researcher, Alexander
Kogan, to contact Facebook users about downloading a personality
quiz application. Around 270,000 users responded. The application
collected not only their data but also harvested the information of all
their friends, giving access to the profiles of an estimated 50–70
million people.142 Kogan then sold this information to a company
called Cambridge Analytica, a political data firm that offered to
identify the preferences of voters based on their personality traits,
friend networks, and Facebook “likes” to influence their behavior
with targeted election advertisements.143 President Trump’s 2016
election campaign thereafter hired Cambridge Analytica to gain
access to these voter profiles,144 as did the Brexit campaign.145 The
ensuing scandal gained notoriety precisely because of the number of
people affected and the fact that they were voters with political
interests, and not merely shoppers with consumer interests. As a
result, the public outcry in the Cambridge Analytica scandal has been
loud and persistent.
In 2018, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) launched an
investigation of the matter premised on Facebook’s violation of a

140. See James Sanders & Dan Patterson, Facebook Data Privacy Scandal: A
Sheet,
TECHREPUBLIC
(July
24,
2019,
8:52
AM),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/facebook-data-privacy-scandal-a-cheat-sheet/
[https://perma.cc/9LBX-BFQR].
141. See Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to
Know
as
Fallout
Widens,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explai
ned.html [https://perma.cc/4TH7-A86Q].
142. See Sanders & Patterson, supra note 140 (reporting the figure was later
revised up to “87 million profiles”).
143. See Granville, supra note 141.
144. Paul Lewis & Paul Hilder, Leaked: Cambridge Analytica’s Blueprint for
Trump
Victory,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
23,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/23/leaked-cambridge-analyticas-blue
print-for-trump-victory [https://perma.cc/HXJ4-QVFB].
145. Sue Halpern, Why the U.K. Condemned Facebook for Fueling Fake News,
NEW
YORKER
(Feb.
22,
2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/why-the-uk-condemned-faceb
ook-for-fuelling-fake-news [https://perma.cc/GH99-ZKXZ].
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2012 consent decree involving data sharing with third-party
applications. Under the consent decree, Facebook agreed, among
other stipulations, to give users clear and conspicuous notice and to
obtain “affirmative express consent” before sharing their data with
third parties.146 Facebook failed to meet this requirement in allowing
Kogan to harvest an enormous trove of data and share it with
Cambridge Analytica.147 In July 2019, the FTC imposed a record $5
billion fine against Facebook for violating the 2012 consent decree
along with new measures to ensure accountability and
transparency.148 European privacy officials also imposed fines under
the then-in-force Data Protection Directive.149 Despite these actions,
civil society organizations like the Electronic Information Privacy
Center (EPIC) insisted that privacy regulators must do more to
change Facebook’s predatory business practices — in particular,
arguing that the FTC either failed to follow up on its consent orders
or did not do so fast enough.150 FTC largely leaves tech companies’
privacy violations unpunished, revealing a potential enforcement gap.
It is this gap that State, and now City, Attorneys are seemingly
stepping in to fill.

146. David C. Vladeck, Facebook, Cambridge Analytica, and the Regulator’s
Dilemma: Clueless or Venal?, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2018),

https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/facebook-cambridge-analytica-and-the-regulatorsdilemma-clueless-or-venal/ [https://perma.cc/X496-ZLS5].
147. Id.
148. See FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions
FED.
TRADE
COMMISSION
(July
24,
2019),
on
Facebook,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penaltysweeping-new-privacy-restrictions [https://perma.cc/E7B7-BLLA].
149. See Facebook Fined £500,000 for Cambridge Analytica Scandal, BBC NEWS
(Oct.
25,
2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-45976300
[https://perma.cc/P97T-ALPX]. Much more severe fines could have been pursued
under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that entered into force in
May 2018. See Ira Rubinstein & Bilyana Petkova, The International Impact of the
GDPR, in C OMMENTARY ON THE GDPR 8 (Marc Cole & Franziska Boehm eds.,
forthcoming 2020).
150. Under a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, EPIC revealed that
since the FTC issued the 2012 Consent Order against Facebook there were 26,000
pending consumer complaints against Facebook on file and not a single legal action.

See EPIC FOIA-FTC Confirms Number of Pending Facebook Complaints, Doubling
Every Two Years, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://epic.org/2019/04/epic-foia---ftc-confirms-numbe.html
[https://perma.cc/3VKJ-43NY]. EPIC is seeking to block the automatic approval of
the settlement. See Natasha Singer, Privacy Group Files Legal Challenge to
Facebook’s $5 Billion F.T.C. Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/technology/facebook-ftc-epic-privacy.html
[https://perma.cc/6D59-YJSE].
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As a city-state jurisdiction, the position of Washington, D.C., is
unique within the United States. In 2018, before the FTC acted,
Washington, D.C. Attorney General Karl Racine filed a complaint
under the District’s Consumer Protection Procedures’ Act (CPPA).151
Racine alleged that Facebook did not meet consumers’ reasonable
expectations of privacy, including that of more than 340,000 D.C.
residents, when it failed to protect their data in the Cambridge
Analytica matter. Substantively, the allegations of misrepresentation
and lack of reasonable oversight of third-parties’ applications in the
Racine complaint matched those later raised by the FTC.152
However, Racine’s claim that Facebook needed to notify its users of
the unintended use of their data by Cambridge Analytica likely goes a
notch further. In terms of remedies, much would depend on what
constitutes a single violation under the CPPA. Although the AG had
not specified amounts, D.C.’s consumer protection law provides for
treble damages or $1500 per violation (whichever is greater), in
addition to injunctive relief, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.153
The AG found the new settlement with Facebook reached by the
FTC unsatisfactory and has proceeded further with this litigation. In
spite of Facebook’s dispute over the D.C. court’s jurisdiction, so far,
the claim has been allowed to proceed. The D.C. Superior Court
asserted that it had jurisdiction since Facebook engaged in continuous
and systemic business activities with D.C. residents, acquiring
substantial revenue from consumers in the District.154 Setting aside
the question of whether the municipal tier is the right level of
regulation when it comes to ensuring privacy protections in the
private sector, the example of this case of public interest city
litigation, and the one that follows shows that cities are currently
flexing their muscle as privacy activists to fill in a perceived regulatory
gap.

151. Complaint, District of Columbia v. Facebook, Inc., 2018 CA 008715 B (D.C.
Super. Ct. 2018).
152. Complaint at 6–7, United States v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-cv-2184 (D.D.C.
July 24, 2019).
153. See Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA), D.C. CODE §§ 28–3905
(2014).
154. See Andrew Harris & Daniel Stoller, Facebook Must Proceed with Privacy
Breach
Lawsuit,
BLOOMBERG
(June
2,
2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-02/facebook-must-proceed-with-pr
ivacy-breach-suit-d-c-judge-rules [https://perma.cc/ULL3-NM26].
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ii. San Francisco and Chicago versus Equifax
Last but not least, in the string of litigation that portrays cities as
participants in nation-wide debates, are the data breach cases filed by
the City Attorneys of San Francisco155 and Chicago156 against
Equifax. The firm is among the three largest U.S. credit reporting
agencies, and its business consists of amassing extensive personal
records, which it sells to third-parties for a range of uses where an
individual’s creditworthiness determines his or her eligibility for
various products and services (for example, consumer credit,
insurance, cellphone service, student loans, home purchases, car
leases, and so on).157 Equifax collects and maintains data of 820
million customers worldwide.158 In 2016 alone, the company reported
annual revenue of more than $3.1 billion.159
In 2017, Equifax suffered a major data breach that compromised
the personal information of more than 145 million Americans.160
Both the FTC and the CFPB could have pursued civil penalties for
the breach under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and could
have immediately pursued civil penalties calculated by experts of up
to $48,000 per violation.161 However, the FTC instead chose to rely
on the FTCA, even though the statute does not grant the Commission
any immediate fining authority.162 Almost two years later, Equifax
155. See generally Complaint, People v. Equifax, Inc., No. CGC 17-56129 (Cal.
App. Dep’t Super Ct.) (filed Sept. 26, 2017).
156. See generally City of Chicago v. Equifax, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-01470 (N.D. Ga.
May 22, 2018).
157. See Stacy Cowley, Equifax to Pay at Least $650 Million in Largest-Ever Data
Breach
Settlement,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
22,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/business/equifax-settlement.html
[https://perma.cc/49HC-7XM9].
158. See Tara Siegel Bernard et al., Equifax Says Cyberattack May Have Affected
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
7,
2017),
143
Million
in
the
U.S.,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/business/equifax-cyberattack.html
[https://perma.cc/5S39-QHTF].
159. See EQUIFAX, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT: THE POWER OF INSIGHTS 2 (2016),
https://investor.equifax.com/~/media/Files/E/Equifax-IR/Annual%20Reports/2016-an
nual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DLA-GNGK].
160. Cowley, supra note 157.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s (2012); Thomas M. Cull, An Overview of Damages
Recoverable Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 8, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/overview-damages-recoverable-under-fair-cred
it-reporting-act [https://perma.cc/U9EW-WJ28]; Interview with David Vladeck,
Former Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n, in Washington, D.C. (March 23, 2019).
162. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2012); see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The FTC Can
Rise to the Privacy Challenge, but not Without Help from Congress, BROOKINGS
INST.
(Aug.
8,
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/08/08/the-ftc-can-rise-to-the-privacy-c
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agreed to a settlement that included a still hefty penalty of $575–700
million.163
In terms of injunctive relief, Equifax agreed to a set of extensive
measures, including the establishment of a detailed security program
over the course of 20 years and reports to the FTC of data incidents,
as well as biennial security assessments by a third party.164 The
monetary and injunctive relief was granted based on three legal
grounds raised by the FTC. First, the FTC asserted Equifax’s failure
to apply reasonable measures to secure data in the knowledge of
security vulnerabilities.165 Without showing concrete examples, the
Commission pointed out that as a result, the breach led to “a
Second, the company
substantial injury” to consumers.166
misrepresented its security and privacy policies, misleading
consumers about its products. Finally, the company failed to meet its
obligations under federal law requiring financial institutions to
develop a comprehensive written information security program.167
Although the FTC began investigating the Equifax breach in the
fall of 2017,168 it did not reach a final settlement until the summer of
2019. Within a few months of the breach, however, the San Francisco
City Attorney filed the first legal action for privacy breach in the
country by a governmental actor.169 This action raised several claims:
first, that the company failed to implement reasonable security
measures in violation of the California Customer Records Act

hallenge-but-not-without-help-from-congress/ [https://perma.cc/L23R-428Q] (“The
FTC generally cannot issue a fine for Section 5 violations initially — fines can only be
issued for violations of consent decrees[.]”).
163. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Equifax to Pay $575 Million as
Part of Settlement with FTC, CFPB, and States Related to 2017 Data Breach (July
22,
2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/equifax-pay-575-million-partsettlement-ftc-cfpb-states-related [https://perma.cc/JYL4-XF23] (noting that the
payment was divided between the offices of 48 AGs, the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico, the CFPB, and a fund that compensates consumers).
164. Id.
165. Complaint at 12–15, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Equifax Inc., No.
1:190mi-99999-UNA (N.D. Ga. July 22, 2019).
166. Id. at 19.
167. Id. at 21.
168. Russell Brandom, The FTC Is Looking into the Equifax Breach, VERGE
(Sept.
14,
2017),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/14/16306872/equifax-breach-ftc-probe-lawsuit-vulne
rability [https://perma.cc/MCH6-VQ7L].
169. Complaint, Herrara v. Equifax, No. CGC-17-561529 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 26,
2017).
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(CRA),170 and that this failure compromised the data of
approximately 44% of the U.S. population, including 15 million
Californian residents; second, that Equifax exacerbated the risk of
identity theft and fraud faced by Californian consumers by delaying
notification of the breach until six weeks after the discovery of the
breach, in violation of California’s breach notification law, which
requires expedient notification if personal information is unencrypted
or reasonably believed to have been acquired by an unauthorized
person.171
The City Attorney based San Francisco’s standing on California’s
Business and Professional Code, which gives the city the right to enter
a suit on behalf of local residents when a company is allegedly
conducting “unlawful, unfair and fraudulent” business practices
within the city.172 The city met the “injury in fact” standard because
California residents suffered financial harm from the Equifax breach
even though the complaint did not cite any particular injured party.173
The city sought civil penalties of $2500 for each violation, restitution
to Californians who used Equifax’s services, and injunctive relief.174
Chicago filed a suit against Equifax under the city’s Consumer
Fraud, Unfair Competition, or Deceptive Practices Ordinance.175
The city asserted jurisdiction since the company was conducting
unfair and deceptive practices while doing business in Chicago, and
the conduct of Equifax resulted in compromising the personal
information of 5.4 million residents of Illinois, including an uncounted
number of people who resided in Chicago.176 The Chicago Corporate
Counsel raised four claims: First, that Equifax fell short of its public
promises to make the protection of personal data its “top priority.”177
Second, it failed to implement security industry best practices (for
example, encryption, deployment of available fixes, and patches in
the knowledge of security vulnerabilities).178 Third, it failed to
provide timely and full notice of the breach to Chicago residents (in

170. Id. at 13.
171. Id. at 18. Delays are possible in case of criminal investigations, but Equifax’s
delay did not result from the request of a law enforcement agency in that context.
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.82(a)–(b) (2020).
172. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (1993).
173. Complaint, supra note 169, at 19.
174. Id.
175. Complaint, Chicago v. Equifax, No. 2017-CH-13047 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 28,
2017).
176. Id. at 2–4.
177. Id. at 11.
178. Id. at 6–10.
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violation of the Illinois Personal Information Privacy Act (PIPA)).179
And fourth, that Equifax engaged in further unfair and deceptive
practices after the breach.180
As in the San Francisco case and that of the federal agencies,
Chicago claimed that the Equifax data breach caused potential harm
to Chicago residents by exposing them to the risk of identity theft and
financial fraud but did not give examples of particular victims and
occasions of harm.181 The Chicago complaint went slightly beyond
the San Francisco and federal complaints because Chicago also raised
claims of emotional harm to local residents based on lost time, fear,
and anxiety.182
The participation of various cities in privacy enforcement actions
seeking to protect the public interest reveals certain patterns. First,
the cases that they chose to litigate are usually high-profile ones —
both the Cambridge Analytica incident and the Equifax breach are
prime examples of high-profile cases with significant nation-wide, and
even global, impact. Second, the city attorneys (sometimes in concert
with the state AGs) are usually the first governmental actor to start
litigation, serving as an alarm bell for federal enforcement agencies.
Unlike in other expertise-heavy data breach cases where the state
AGs participate at the end stages of litigation, leaving the FTC to
invest resources into an investigation and then sharing the
settlement,183 in the cases we discuss city law offices are first movers
in litigating.
Although legally speaking, all cases fall within the same title —
privacy consumer protection — thematically, they can be divided into
two types. In the electoral context, the Cambridge Analytica suit,
much like in the context of political representation and local
autonomy, the Census 2020 litigation tries to preserve democratic

179. See id. at 12–13; see also Personal Information Protection Act, 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 530/5 (2006). This PIPA violation was an “unlawful practice” that gave the
Corporate Counsel authority to sue under the city ordinance. Complaint, supra note
169, at 12.
180. Although Chicago had the option of bringing some of the claims under the
city ordinance alone, it chose not to do so since the local privacy ordinance would not
have justified the notice requirement under PIPA. Telephone Interview, Office of the
Chicago Attorney General (Apr. 19, 2019).
181. The Chicago City AG used emphatic language: “Chicago is not required to
demonstrate harm to its residents to enforce the Ordinance.” See Complaint, supra
note 175, at 13.
182. See id. at 14–15.
183. Interview with David Vladeck, supra note 161.
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values.184 The Equifax cases, in turn, are aimed at improving
consumer protection standards in data-intense sectors185 and are
based on a broad interpretation of harm that might have triggered or
reaffirmed such an interpretation on the federal level.186 Further,
unlike in other areas of law where cities abruptly clash with states
trying to preempt city ordinances along party lines,187 data privacy

184. Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game Today — and
to Change the Game, BROOKINGS INST. (July 12, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-a
nd-how-to-change-the-game/ [https://perma.cc/2SJD-4TY2].
185. Los Angeles also filed a suit against Uber in another major data breach case
with a national dimension, and so did Chicago, followed by Illinois. See David Cohen
et al., U.S. City Suits: The Next Frontier of Data Breach Actions, N.Y.L.J. (Feb. 21,
2018),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/02/21/city-suits-the-nextfrontier-of-data-breach-actions/ [https://perma.cc/H6R9-MC72] (discussing how in
the state of Illinois settled, but the office of the Chicago AG decided to continue
litigating in the Uber litigation). Data breach litigation on the city level has also
emerged against more traditional industries that are becoming increasingly
data-intense. See generally Complaint, Chicago v. Marriott, No. 2019-CH-00948
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2019).
186. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136
S.Ct. 1540 (2016), there is a substantial circuit split on the harm standard in U.S.
Courts of Appeals. See Rahul Mukhi & Tanner Mathison, Supreme Court Declines
to Review Standing in the Data Breach Context Despite Ongoing Circuit Split,
CLEARY GOTTLIEB: CLEARY CYBERSECURITY & PRIVACY WATCH (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://www.clearycyberwatch.com/2018/03/supreme-court-declines-review-standingdata-breach-context-despite-ongoing-circuit-split/
[https://perma.cc/V6F7-WKEH]
(“[T]he D.C., Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold[] that data
theft, with the attendant risk of future identify theft fraud, is by itself sufficient for
Article III standing, and the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits hold[], in contrast,
that such allegations are not sufficient on their own to satisfy Article III’s injury
requirements.” (internal citations omitted)). A number of courts have held that data
breach alone is sufficient for establishing standing by satisfying “the injury in fact”
threshold under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, while others have focused on the
actual misuse of the data as a threshold requirement. See generally Spokeo, Inc., 136
S. Ct. 1540; Luke Martin, Resolving the Circuit Split on Article III Standing for Data
Breach
Suits,
C OLUM .
B US .
L.
R EV .
(Aug.
13,
2019),
https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/announcement/view/181
[https://perma.cc/C6TY-K8Z2] (citing Mukhi & Mathison, supra note 186). The FTC
has never adopted a firm stance on the matter. Jonathan S. Kolodner et al., Latest

How

FTC Data Privacy Settlement May Signal More Direct Approach to Regulating Data
Security, CLEARY GOTTLIEB: CLEARY CYBERSECURITY & PRIVACY WATCH (Nov. 20,

2019), https://www.clearycyberwatch.com/2019/11/latest-ftc-data-privacy-settlementmay-signal-more-direct-approach-to-regulating-data-security/
[https://perma.cc/SEQ6-HQJD]. Since harm can prove intractable in privacy claims,
the broader interpretation of that threshold espoused by state and city AGs under
state and municipal legislation might help inform both the federal bench and the FTC
in asserting a firm standard.
187. See Briffault, supra note 27, at 1997–98; Davidson, supra note 36, at 959–60.
Sarah Swan explains there is generally limited state pushback against local litigation
in terms of the prevalence of issues that are not polarizing and attract condemnation
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litigation shows a harmonious city-state relationship of
well-resourced, big cities working shoulder-to-shoulder with their
states. That dynamic might be exemplary of what Schragger dubs as
“our federalism’s anti-urbanism” or the tendency of U.S.-state based
federalism to disfavor decentralization to sub-state governments, and
to exert any real-life influence, often cities need to be in synchrony
with their states.188 In this sense, large, cosmopolitan cities’ privacy
activism in the United States is emerging within progressive states,
and opposition seems more likely to come from a conservative federal
administration.189 At least when it comes to enforcement, there
seems to be no horizontal city coordination because, unlike with state
attorneys general, 190 city attorneys general do not share a venue for
collective action.
Certainly, city litigation with data privacy implications fits neatly
into the wider partisan dynamics where local actors serve as checks on
federal power through the institutional venue of federalism.191 As the
office of the City Attorney of Chicago remarked:
It would be correct to say . . . that a number of our present initiatives
(including but not limited to in the data privacy arena) are driven by
a concern that at present the federal government is not taking
sufficient action to protect the health, safety, and interests of
Chicago residents.192

across party lines. See generally Sarah L. Swan, Preempting Plaintiff Cities, 45
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1241 (2018). Although some litigation efforts like the recent
cases about removing Confederate monuments can also be inflammatory, the
examples we bring of local privacy litigation against private companies fit Swan’s
findings. Id. at 1284.
188. Richard C. Schragger, The Attach on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163,
1184 (2018). In 2018, Chicago introduced its own, far-reaching consumer privacy
ordinance that has, however, since stalled. See generally Chi. City Council
O2018-3240, 2018 Sess. (Chi. 2019) (amendment failed to pass).
189. See, e.g., Cristiano Lima & John Hendel, California Democrats to Congress:
Don’t Bulldoze Our Privacy Law, POLITICO (Feb. 21, 2019, 5:07 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/21/congress-data-privacy-california-1185943
[https://perma.cc/45R6-HJ8B] (describing state efforts to fend off federal preemption
of the CCPA); Nilay Patel, Facebook’s $5 Billion FTC Fine Is an Embarrassing Joke,
VERGE
(July
12,
2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/12/20692524/facebook-five-billion-ftc-fine-embarras
sing-joke [https://perma.cc/REG4-7XK3] (criticizing lenient federal enforcement of
privacy regulations).
190. See
generally
About
NAAG,
NAT.
ASS’N
ATT’YS
GEN.,
https://www.naag.org/naag/about_naag.php
[https://perma.cc/3B7T-AV4X]
(last
visited Feb. 21, 2020).
191. See Gerken, supra note 82, at 1959; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan
Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1096 (2014).
192. Interview with David Vladeck, supra note 161.
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However, attitudes toward Silicon Valley and concomitant privacy
issues vary both across and within party lines, demonstrating the
nuances of partisan federalism in this field.193 Further, unlike with
state and city attorneys general, FTC’s settlements do not go to the
Commission’s coffers, but directly to the Federal Treasury. Coupled
with the revenue-raising restraints cities face as outlined above, this is
possibly creating a depoliticized, purely financial incentive for
prosecutors on both the state and the city level to bring actions.
Chicago is not dropping its charges at the moment of writing in the
wake of the FTC settlement with Equifax,194 while San Francisco has
yet to announce its decision on the matter.195 The trend shows the
crossing of public interest litigation with profit-seeking on the side of
city actors.
III. THE CITY AS DATA STEWARD

At every level of government — federal, state, and local —
government agencies amass personal data and must manage their
data assets in the public interest. Cities collect and utilize an
extensive range of personal and sensitive data and do so with
relatively few encumbrances from superior levels of government.
When they act explicitly as data stewards, cities not only carry out
day-to-day management tasks but also take on “fiduciary-like
responsibilities to consider the ethical and privacy impacts of
particular data activities and to act with the best interests of
individuals and society in mind.”196 According to Kelsey Finch and

193. For example, a draft federal bill introduced by Democratic Senator Markey
may prevent state and city prosecutors from brining legal actions once the FTC has
entered a consent order:
If the Commission institutes an action with respect to a violation of this Act
or a regulation promulgated under this Act, a State may not, during the
pendency of that action, institute an action under subsection (a) against any
defendant named in the complaint in the action instituted by the
Commission based on the same set of facts giving rise to the violation with
respect to which the Commission instituted the action.
Privacy Bill of Rights Act, S. 1214, 116th Cong. § 16(e) (2019).
194. E-mail from Office of the Chi. Attorney Gen. (July 22, 2019) (on file with
author).
195. Dominic Fracassa, Equifax Agrees to Pay $600 Million for 2017 Data Breach,
S.F.
CHRON.
(July
22,
2019),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Equifax-agrees-to-pay-600-million-for-20
17-data-14112539.php [https://perma.cc/445P-J8GB].
196. Kelsey Finch & Omer Tene, Smart Cities: Privacy, Transparency and
Community, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 126–27 (Evan
Selinger et al. eds., 2018).

792

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

Omer Tene, data stewardship consists of a familiar set of data
governance and accountability mechanisms.197 Its five components
include first, “privacy management programs establishing principles
and practices that apply to collecting, viewing, storing, sharing,
aggregating, analyzing, and using personal data.”198 Second, an
oversight mechanism for such programs, which minimally requires
Third, privacy risk
appointing a designated privacy lead.199
management, which may entail conducting Privacy Impact
Assessments as well as a benefit-risk analysis for big data projects that
promise tremendous benefits but that also “introduce new privacy
and civil liberties concerns associated with large-scale data collection
and analysis.”200 Fourth, vendor management — because so many
smart city developments depend on public-private partnerships.201
Fifth, an ethical review processes akin to the rules for conducting
human subject research whenever cities allow public or private
researchers access to big data.202 This is especially true if the research
involves secondary purposes (i.e., “appropriating civic data that was
originally collected for another purpose without citizens’ knowledge
or consent”).203
Cities do not always achieve this ideal of data stewardship. As the
case studies below demonstrate, cities must fully embrace their role as
data stewards when they process data incidental to delivering city
services and share it among city agencies under the terms of
interagency data sharing agreements or local privacy regulations.
They face greater challenges in protecting data and serving the public
interest when they interact with powerful commercial actors
motivated by private interests. Nor are the privacy measures cities
adopt in commercial interactions uniform across all cases. Privacy
measures adopted range from arms-length agreements in which cities
bargain away privacy rights in exchange for private firms offering
discounted or “free” services such as broadband;204 to ill-conceived
regulations forcing sharing economy firms to hand over customer data
(which have sparked lawsuits by regulated firms positioning
197. Id. at 127.
198. Id. at 128.
199. See id. at 130.
200. Id. at 130–31.
201. See id. at 182–84 (describing vendor management in terms of clearly
delineating responsibilities of cities and vendors for privacy management, public
communication, and supervision of other contractors and subcontractors).
202. See id. at 133–34.
203. See id. at 133.
204. See infra note 239.
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themselves as protecting their customers’ privacy interests against the
city government);205 to more collaborative forms of data sharing in
which cities and technology platforms experiment with open data or
data trusts;206 and, finally, to more complex and protracted
engagements such as the Toronto Quayside project, where
government, the private sector, and local citizenry are contesting the
very soul of the smart city.207
A. Managing City Data

A recent trend in urban governance is the delivery of more
efficient and effective services via data integration and analysis, a
trend that extends to traditional social services.208 Many families
receive services and benefits from multiple public and private
programs. Yet, all too often, caseworkers working with the same
families are not even aware of one another in part because they
maintain their data in siloed databases. Data integration and analysis
not only allows caseworkers to coordinate services for clients but also
to do a better job of matching individual clients with existing services
and improve policy decisions and program development more
generally.209 Integrated social service programs entirely depend on
the collection, sharing, and repurposing of highly personal data.210
They, therefore, require very tight controls over data access, use,
disclosure, and retention to avoid gross privacy violations.
Proponents of data-driven solutions have viewed privacy rules as a
nuisance akin to bureaucracy211 or acknowledged that local
government has responsibility for privacy and security protections but

205. See Rick Schmitt, The Sharing Economy: Can the Law Keep Pace with
STAN.
LAW.
(May
31,
2017),
Innovation?,

https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/the-sharing-economy-can-the-law-ke
ep-pace-with-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/WJC5-4QJK].
206. See Jane Croft, Data Trusts Raise Questions on Privacy and Governance, FIN.
TIMES
(Sept.
12,
2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/a683b8e4-a3ef-11e9-a282-2df48f366f7d
[https://perma.cc/V6Q6-MUTG].
207. Leyland Cecco, ‘Surveillance Capitalism’: Critic Urges Toronto to Abandon
Smart
City
Project,
GUARDIAN
(June
6,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/jun/06/toronto-smart-city-google-project-pri
vacy-concerns [https://perma.cc/TDX2-L893].
208. See generally GOLDSMITH & KLEIMAN, supra note 14.
209. See id. at 109–49.
210. See id.
211. See, e.g., Robert Goerge, Data for the Public Good: Challenges and Barriers
in the Context of Cities, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD:
FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 153 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014).
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without otherwise giving the topic any further attention.212 More
recently, innovative cities have taken up the privacy challenge by
developing standardized data-sharing agreements with strong privacy
provisions. New York City is a good example.213
In 2008, the Mayor’s Office issued Executive Order 114, launching
an initiative to facilitate data integration and exchange among
multiple Health and Human Services (HHS) agencies; privacy
concerns barely registered beyond requiring that data sharing comply
“with all applicable Federal, State and local laws and regulations.”214
However, participating agencies had to sign an agreement providing
for the protection and confidentiality of all data exchanged or
accessed by “HHS-Connect” systems.215 The agreement imposed
various obligations under the Fair Information Practice Principles
(FIPPs), which are the basis for modern privacy regulation.216
Applicable principles included purpose limitations, access rights as
determined by the source agency, use restrictions, access controls, and
data security, training of personnel, and adherence to citywide IT
policies (mainly security and responsible use).217 Over the next
decade, New York City continued to extoll data sharing while
demonstrating limited concern for privacy. For example, the city
enacted an Open Data Law, mandating that by the end of 2018, the
city make freely available, on a single web portal, all “public” data
sets.218 It also created the Mayor’s Office of Data Analytics
(MODA), with responsibilities for collaborative, data-driven
solutions, a citywide data platform, oversight for data projects, and

212. See generally GOLDSMITH & KLEIMAN, supra note 14.
213. Data Sharing Cooperative, NEW YORK STATE GIS, https://gis.ny.gov/co-op/
[https://perma.cc/432N-SWHZ] (last visited Mar. 28, 2020).
214. See N.Y. City Mayor Exec. Order No. 114 (Mar. 18, 2008),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/eo/eo_114.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GVL-TF4W].
215. See generally Inter-Agency Data Exchange Agreement, Agencies of the City
of
N.Y.
(Nov.
2010),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/finance/downloads/pdf/mou/interagency_data_exchange_
hhs.pdf [https://perma.cc/CE3E-URPV].
216. There are different formulations of FIPPs, which vary as to both the number
of principles and their substantive content, but they generally address collection and
use limitations, purpose specification, data quality, security, transparency, access and
correction, and accountability. See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
& DEV. (OECD), REVISED OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY
AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (2013).
217. See ALON YARONI ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, WORKER CONNECT: A
PROCESS EVALUATION OF A NEW YORK CITY DATA INTEGRATION SYSTEM (2015),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/opportunity/pdf/workerbriefs7c.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2M2L-9LG5].
218. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 23-501–09 (McKinney 2012).
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implementation of the Open Data Law. New York City’s inattention
to privacy concerns finally changed in November 2017, when the City
enacted its first comprehensive privacy laws in the form of two laws
designed to protect personal information collected by city employees
and contractors in the course of providing local services and
benefits.219
New York City has done an excellent job of addressing the privacy
issues associated with data integration and analysis, evolving from
data-sharing agreements to a local ordinance requiring
comprehensive citywide privacy policies and protocols. In its zeal to
improve city life by processing and analyzing massive amounts of
data, however, the city has been less successful in identifying and
correcting issues related to algorithmic fairness, accountability, and
transparency. Over the past five years, both privacy scholars and
far-sighted regulators have recognized, in the words of John Podesta,
former advisor to President Obama, that “big data analytics have the
potential to eclipse longstanding civil rights protections in how
personal information is used in housing, credit, employment, health,
education, and the marketplace.”220 For example, the use of
predictive algorithms to maximize interest in online job postings can
lead to ads being “delivered in a way that reinforces gender and racial
stereotypes, even when employers have no such intent.”221
Algorithms recognize and, in some cases, reproduce existing patterns
in employment, even when those patterns are the result of past
discrimination.222 Thus, while big data analytics can help identify
patterns of bias and illegal exclusion, it can also hide continued bias

219. Local Law 245 requires every city agency to report on their data collection,
retention, and disclosure policies and current practices. See N.Y.C., Local Law 245,
Interim B. No. 1557-A (Dec. 17, 2017) (codified at N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 23-1203–
05 (McKinney 2017)). Local Law 247 requires city employees and contractors to
protect all “identifying information” by limiting its collection, disclosure, and
retention, except where required by law. Requests for the collection or disclosure of
identifying information would be processed by a newly established privacy officer
within each agency who would analyze whether the collection or disclosure would
further the purpose or mission of the agency. N.Y.C., Local Law 247, Interim B. No.
1588-A (Dec. 17, 2017) (codified at N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 23-1201–02 (McKinney
2017)). For a more detailed discussion of both laws, see Rubinstein, supra note 3, at
2010–13.
220. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES,
PRESERVING VALUES iii (2014).
221. See, e.g., Miranda Bogen, All the Ways Hiring Algorithms Can Introduce
Bias,
HARV.
BUS.
REV.
(May
6,
2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/05/all-the-ways-hiring-algorithms-can-introduce-bias
[https://perma.cc/U6RK-N5K8].
222. Id.
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behind a veil of impartial mathematics.223 This problem can be
equally pernicious whether the algorithm in question was designed
and implemented by the public or the private sector.224
In some ways, the city’s neglect of these issues is not surprising.
There is a long history of surveillance and policing of welfare
applicants in the United States that predates data analytics.225 More
recently, scholars have identified “algorithmic discrimination” as an
emergent topic in privacy scholarship and have called attention to
both the due process deficits of data analytics and its harmful impact
on people of color and other historically marginalized communities.226
Although the city has taken a preliminary step toward addressing
these concerns by appointing a cross-disciplinary group of experts to
an Automated Decision Systems Task Force, with the goal of
developing a process for reviewing the algorithms the city uses
through the lens of equity, fairness, and accountability,227 the task
force is behind in its goal of issuing a report of policy

223. AARON RIEKE ET AL., UPTURN, CIVIL RIGHTS, BIG DATA, AND OUR
ALGORITHMIC
FUTURE
3,
12–14
(2014),
https://bigdata.fairness.io/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015-04-20-Civil-Rights-Big-D
ata-and-Our-Algorithmic-Future-v1.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA23-9JW7].
224. Id.
225. See generally JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE,
RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (2001).
226. See, e.g., LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL
RIGHTS
PRINCIPLES
FOR
THE
ERA
OF
BIG
DATA
(2014),
https://civilrights.org/2014/02/27/civil-rights-principles-era-big-data/
[https://perma.cc/CTP5-WNV5]; Danielle Keats Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18
(2014); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 99 (2014);
Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 633 (2017);
Andrew Selbst & Solon Barocas, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
671, 671 (2016). More specifically, the same analytic tools driving digital innovation in
city (and state) welfare programs may be invasive and punitive when examined from
the perspective of their intended beneficiaries — such as the poor and the homeless.
See VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS
PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 178–200 (2017). Eubanks evaluated an
automated eligibility program for health care, food stamps and cash benefits in
Indiana, an algorithm for evaluating comparative vulnerability of homeless people
vying for limited housing placements in Los Angeles, and the use of a statistical
model to predict child abuse in Pittsburgh and found a host of problems. These
ranged from programming errors and inadequate (i.e., biased) data, to inflexibility
and lack of accountability on the part of program administrators, to an utter lack of
choice on the part of affected individuals whose data form a part of these systems.
227. See N.Y.C. AUTOMATED DECISION SYSTEMS TASK FORCE, AUTOMATED
DECISION
SYSTEMS
TASK
FORCE
REPORT
2
(2019),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/adstaskforce/downloads/pdf/ADS-Report-11192019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZNS8-EMMC].
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recommendations by Fall 2019.228 More generally, responding to
algorithmic discrimination remains one of the great unfinished tasks
of city data governance.
B. Commercial Data Sharing Agreements

The preceding Sections suggest that in developing data-driven
policies to improve the quality of urban life, cities have all the
political power they need to govern the relevant data. In fact, the
social service programs that cities hope to improve are mostly funded
by federal and state programs that carry their own complex
requirements and burdens. Apart from any constraints accompanying
such programs, however, cities operate with a very free hand in
governing local data.229 Neither are the city’s regulatory powers
preempted by federal or state law, given that the federal Privacy Act
applies exclusively to personal data held by federal agencies. Most
states lack comparable laws regarding state agencies, and the minority
states with such laws limit their scope exclusively to state, as opposed
to local agencies.230 When cities enter into commercial agreements
with private firms, however, they must contend with the privacy
practices and norms of some very large and powerful actors.
Moreover, these market forces may exert greater sway over cities
than any statutory rules from higher levels of government. This next
Section examines commercial interactions with three sectors of great
importance to twenty-first-century cities: broadband, the sharing
economy, and smart city technology firms, including those engaged in
high-profile projects such as Toronto Quayside.
Broadband, in the form of readily available and inexpensive fiber
connections and advanced wireless capability, is increasingly
important to economic growth, education, and healthcare.231 Many
cities have recognized that cheap, unlimited communication capacity
is essential to the future prospects of their citizens and their
community, while at the same time recognizing that a vast digital

228. See Diana Budds, New York City’s AI Task Force Stalls, CURBED (Apr. 16,
2019),
https://ny.curbed.com/2019/4/16/18335495/new-york-city-automated-decision-system-t
ask-force-ai [https://perma.cc/49D9-FKGL].
229. See Rubinstein, supra note 3, at 2046–47.
230. Id. at 1981 (noting that “New York’s Personal Privacy Protection Act requires
that each state agency ‘that maintains systems of records’ must comply with the FIPs.
But this law does not apply to local governments” (citations omitted)).
231. See SUSAN CRAWFORD, FIBER: THE COMING TECH REVOLUTION — AND WHY
AMERICA MIGHT MISS IT 13–17 (2018).
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divide separates rich and poor residents.232 Cities have therefore
made it an explicit policy objective to narrow this digital divide by
investing in innovative ways to provide high-speed internet access to
homes, businesses, and the public, or even rolling out free, public
wireless services. Some of these initiatives have proven ill-advised
from a privacy perspective and illustrate the same neglect of privacy
issues by cities as in the early days of data-driven city services.
Unlike the rollout of broadband, where cities try to attract private
investment, the sharing economy needs the city as much as the city
needs the sharing economy. Data-intense businesses in the sharing
economy differ from platforms like Facebook or data brokers like
Equifax because they offer “what might . . . be called ‘real-world’
goods and services,” such as transportation and housing.233 Urban
density provides a critical mass of providers and consumers
“sufficiently close to each other or to other amenities to make
[sharing companies] work.”234 Beyond filling in shortages in housing
and transportation by freeing up surplus goods, the sharing economy
provides another crucial asset for the city: data. The troves of
aggregate data amassed by sharing enterprises can improve local
government by guiding urban planners toward the optimization of
housing or reducing traffic congestion.235 But the relevant data
sharing agreements may — or may not — fully account for privacy
costs to local residents.
Cities have adopted vastly different
approaches to data sharing arrangements with sharing economy firms
ranging from intrusive regulations to experiments with data
collaboratives.
“Smart city” is a buzzword with no fixed meaning.236 At the very
least, it describes cities permeated by “software-enabled
infrastructures and networked digital devices and sensors that are
used to augment urban management and governance.”237 At the
same time, smart cities are cities where technology-driven innovation

232. Id. at 135–57. The digital divide also separates urban from rural Americans,
but that topic is beyond the scope of this Article.
233. Nestor Davidson, The Sharing Economy as an Urban Phenomenon, 34 Y ALE
L. & P OL ’ Y R EV . 215, 218 n.10 (2016).
234. Id. at 218.
235. See generally GOLDSMITH & CRAWFORD, supra note 14.
236. See Rob Kitchin et al., Smart Cities and the Politics of Urban Data, in SMART
URBANISM: UTOPIAN VISION OR FALSE DAWN? 17 (Simon Marvin et al. eds., 2015).
See generally ADAM GREENFIELD, AGAINST THE SMART CITY (2013); ANTHONY M.
TOWNSEND, SMART CITIES: BIG DATA, CIVIC HACKERS, AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW
UTOPIA (2013).
237. Kitchin et al., supra note 236, at 17.
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and entrepreneurship both attract jobs and investments, and make
government work better.238 Some of the world’s largest technology
companies operate smart city initiatives combining networking
infrastructure, IoT devices, and data-driven analysis. One of these
firms, Sidewalk Labs — a division of Alphabet, and sister company of
Google, which has an ambitious smart city project underway in
Toronto, Ontario — perfectly illustrates the problems that arise when
cities allow the private sector to set the agenda for governing the
smart city.

i. Bargaining Away Privacy Rights
Both major cities and small towns across the country have begun
experimenting with public-private partnerships as a way to offer free
or low-cost Wi-Fi in public facilities (such as parks, stadiums, or
low-income housing), and much faster but more conventionally priced
internet access deals to the city’s remaining population. Often,
private firms receive certain benefits or regulatory concessions from
local governments in return. For example, Google inked deals with
the mayors of Kansas City, Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri, to
install “Google Fiber” in some government buildings in exchange for
using city offices, equipment, and electricity free of charge.
Moreover, Google negotiated its way around the “universal service”
obligations that typically require big telecommunications companies
to at least offer their services to an entire city or town.239 Although
Google Fiber originally had a free option, Google eventually canceled
and replaced it with a $50 option that offers internet at slower speeds.
Google Fiber also partnered with the Housing Authority of the City
of Austin to offer free Wi-Fi at select affordable housing providers.240
New York City has launched multiple broadband initiatives
ranging from promoting competition in the residential and
commercial broadband markets, to investing in networks for the
provision of free or low-cost high-speed residential access for
low-income communities,241 to a citywide implementation of digital

238. Id. See generally GOLDSMITH & CRAWFORD, supra note 14; GOLDSMITH &
KLEIMAN, supra note 14.
239. See Erica Swanson, Bringing Internet Access to Public Housing Resident,
GOOGLE
FIBER
BLOG
(July
15,
2015),
OFFICIAL
https://fiber.google.com/blog/2015/bringing-internet-access-to-public-housing-residen
ts/ [https://perma.cc/XD2Q-HZRU].
240. Id.
241. For example, the local housing authority partnered with Spot on Networks
(SON) to provide free high-speed Wi-Fi to the residents of the country’s largest
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kiosks called “LinkNYC” (which offer high-speed Internet access and
a range of other popular services including Wi-Fi phone calls, device
charging, and a tablet for access to city services, maps, and
directions).242 In the latter deal, a company called CityBridge agreed
to lay cable, install infrastructure, and operate the LinkNYC network
“for free” in exchange for splitting advertising revenues with the city,
valued at $1 billion over the life of the 12-year franchise agreement.243
One of the major investors in LinkNYC is Sidewalk Labs.244
In Fiber, Susan Crawford describes how companies with monopoly
power over broadband and Internet access (mainly Comcast and
Verizon) use their tremendous lobbying resources to thwart
broadband competition despite the obvious need for massive
investments in fiber infrastructure (the so-called “last mile”
problem).245 Crawford also highlights a few smaller cities and towns
that have invested in community-based broadband to build low-cost,
high-speed networks at the local level. Although project financing is
always a bit precarious for these communities, they have relied
successfully on bonds, federal and state matching grants, and
anticipated budgetary savings to build city-owned community fiber
networks. These networks are designed to reach all local residents,
thereby closing the digital divide and ensuring that the local
community is well-positioned to enjoy future economic growth and
related innovations in education, health, and local governance.246

public housing complex, Queensbridge Houses. See About Queensbridge Connected,
NYC,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/queensbridge/about/about.page
[https://perma.cc/V2MS-SLFW] (last visited Mar. 5, 2020).
242. LINKNYC, https://www.link.nyc/ [https://perma.cc/HM3X-X253] (last visited
Aug. 20, 2019). The touchscreen tablet originally allowed Internet browsing, which
led some people to use the kiosks to blast music and watch porn, forcing the removal
of the browsing capability. See Joshua Brustein, Building a Smart City? Have You
Thought About Porn and Privacy?, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-15/building-a-smart-city-have-youthought-about-porn-and-privacy [https://perma.cc/ULU4-XFX7].
243. See Maren Maier et al., LinkNYC, in SMARTER NEW YORK CITY, HOW CITY
AGENCIES INNOVATE 79–106 (André Corrêa d’Almeida ed., 2018).
244. See Elizabeth Woyke, The Startup Behind NYC’s Plan to Replace Phone
Booths with 7,500 Connected Kiosks, MIT TECH. REV. (July 18, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608281/the-startup-behind-nycs-plan-to-replacephone-booths-with-7500-connected-kiosks/ [https://perma.cc/QM77-7A4R].
245. CRAWFORD, supra note 231, at 37–66.
246. Id. at 67–96 (describing projects in Chattanooga, Tennessee; Wilson and
Greensboro, North Carolina; Winthrop, Minnesota; and Otis, Massachusetts). See
generally Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 796 (2012)
(articulating a legal and public policy strategy for bolstering local authority to enter
the broadband market as service providers).
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There are notable differences between the privacy policies of these
smaller, locally operated broadband providers and those of the larger
firms seeking huge advertising revenues. For example, a glance at the
relevant privacy policies of the towns Crawford highlights shows that
their policies regarding the collection and use of data are reasonably
protective of local users’ privacy interests.247 And a cursory review of
the Spot on Networks (SON) privacy policy at the Queensbridge
public housing project shows that not all locally operated broadband
relies on targeted ads or sale of personal data to third parties to
generate revenue.248 Rather, it appears that local, and to some
extent, federal tax revenues pay for the service.249 Other large cities,
including Boston250 and Kansas City,251 have similar programs that
benefit low-income housing residents and do not sacrifice their
privacy interests.
In sharp contrast, the ad-funded LinkNYC network raises several
serious privacy concerns. The first is that by allowing LinkNYC to
collect data from city residents and visitors for advertising purposes,
the city government has relinquished its data stewardship role by
trading away New Yorkers’ privacy for LinkNYC’s “free” services.
According to privacy advocates, the original CityBridge privacy

247. See,
e.g.,
Privacy
Notice,
EPB
FIBER
OPTICS,
https://epb.com/storage/app/media/uploaded-files/Privacy%20Notice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VWQ2-KWSH] (last visited Mar. 5, 2020); Privacy Policy,
GREENLIGHT COMMUNITY BROADBAND, http://www.greenlightnc.com/privacy/
[https://perma.cc/RQ39-9ZXL] (last visited Mar. 5, 2020); Privacy Policy, RS FIBER,
https://www.rsfiber.coop/privacy-policy/ [https://perma.cc/8P7H-R2QL] (last visited
Mar. 5, 2020).
248. See
Privacy
Policy,
SPOTON
NETWORKS,
https://www.spotonnetworks.com/legal/ [https://perma.cc/F8UB-2G8K] (last visited
Mar. 5, 2020).
249. Gideon Lewis-Kraus, Inside the Battle to Bring Broadband to New York’s
WIRED
(Nov.
3,
2016),
Public
Housing,
https://www.wired.com/2016/11/bringing-internet-to-new-york-public-housing/
[https://perma.cc/M4ML-FMHL].
250. City of Boston Wireless Wicked Free Wi-Fi Privacy Policy, CITY OF BOS.,
https://www.boston.gov/departments/innovation-and-technology/city-boston-wirelesswicked-free-wi-fi-privacy-policy [https://perma.cc/HMN7-79TS] (last visited Mar. 5,
2020).
251. See Free Network Foundation: Connected and Resilient, KAN. CITY DIGITAL
DRIVE,
https://www.kcdigitaldrive.org/project/free-network-foundation/
[https://perma.cc/6QT7-8XGE] (last visited Apr. 3, 2020). Free Network Foundation
worked with a local nonprofit organization to establish free networks serving more
than 600 residences in two low-income housing developments in Kansas City. Id. This
was in direct competition with the Google Fiber project. See Whitney Terrell,
Network
Free
K.C.,
HARPER’S
(Mar.
20,
2013),
https://harpers.org/blog/2013/03/network-free-k-c/ [https://perma.cc/562U-PJ7V].
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policy governing the use of LinkNYC kiosks “allowed nearly limitless
retention of user data, including browsing history.”252 Although
CityBridge modified its privacy policy in response to these and other
objections,253 the updated policy still allows the system to track and
retain “information such as IP addresses, anonymized MAC
addresses, device type, device identifiers, and more, for up to 60 days”
without users’ consent.254 A LinkNYC FAQ offers users various
reassurances on these points,255 but critics remain skeptical, noting
that it is relatively easy to re-identify anonymized and aggregated
information, that LinkNYC kiosks are equipped with Bluetooth
beacons that have not been activated yet but may someday be used to
push location-based mobile ads to passersby devices (even if they
have not registered as Link users), and that Google has a prior history
of Wi-Fi sniffing (the Google Street View case)256 and of
circumventing the anti-tracking protections built into Apple iPhones
(the Safari case).257
The second concern is that the LinkNYC deal increases the risk of
security breaches and unwanted surveillance of users and passersby.
LinkNYC requires users to register with an email address and agree
to allow CityBridge to gain access to their web traffic.258 The kiosks

252. See Shahid Buttar & Amul Kalia, LinkNYC Improves Privacy Policy, Yet
Problems
Remain,
EFF
BLOG
(Oct.
4,
2017),

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/09/linknyc-improves-privacy-policy-yet-problemsremain [https://perma.cc/7WRZ-RHJ5].
253. Id.
254. Id.; see also CityBridge Privacy Policy, LINKNYC (Mar. 17, 2017),
https://www.link.nyc/privacy-policy.html#info
[https://perma.cc/5R54-6NH6]
(classifying such data as “Technical Information” as opposed to personally
identifiable information).
255. See
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
LINKNYC,
https://www.link.nyc/faq.html#data-collection [https://perma.cc/QR4V-DT9Q] (last
visited Mar. 28, 2020).
256. See David Streitfeld, Data Harvesting at Google Not a Rogue Act, Report
Finds,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
28,
2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/technology/google-engineer-told-others-of-datacollection-fcc-report-reveals.html [https://perma.cc/J3BV-U2QR].
257. Nick Pinto, Google Is Transforming NYC’s Payphones into a ‘Personalized
Propaganda
Engine’,
VILLAGE
VOICE
(July
6,
2016),
https://www.villagevoice.com/2016/07/06/google-is-transforming-nycs-payphones-into
-a-personalized-propaganda-engine/ [https://perma.cc/N9FP-FRLJ].
258. City’s Public Wi-Fi Raises Privacy Concerns, N.Y. C.L. UNION (Mar. 16,
2016),
http://www.nyclu.org/news/citys-public-wi-fi-raises-privacy-concerns
[https://perma.cc/CJ5G-YND3] (noting that Link NYC users “must submit their
e-mail addresses and agree to allow CityBridge to collect information about what
websites they visit on their devices, where and how long they linger on certain
information on a webpage, and what links they click on”).
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also contain video cameras that capture a 360-degree view of the
surrounding streets and sidewalks.259 The New York Civil Liberties
Union (NYCLU) has argued that the sheer volume of information
these devices gather “will create a massive database of information
that will present attractive opportunities for hackers and for law
enforcement surveillance, and will carry an undue risk of abuse,
misuse and unauthorized access.”260
A third concern (to which we return below)261 is that LinkNYC is
but the first stage in Alphabet/Sidewalk Lab’s plans to extend the
monetization of personal data from the online world to the physical
landscape. Indeed, during a 2016 talk about reimagining cities, Dan
Doctoroff, the founder and CEO of Sidewalk Labs and former deputy
mayor under Michael Bloomberg, stated as much:
By having access to the browsing activity of people who are using
the Wi-Fi — all anonymized and aggregated — we can actually then
target ads to people in proximity and then obviously over time track
them through lots of different things, like beacons and location
services, as well as their browsing activity. So in effect what we’re
doing is replicating the digital experience in physical space.262

The root cause of the privacy threats associated with LinkNYC is
that New York City issued a design challenge without privacy
requirements or much regard for preserving existing urban privacy on
the streets of New York at all. Arguably, the city could have
leveraged the worth of its extremely valuable sidewalk real estate by
driving a hard bargain that both delivered a public Wi-Fi system with
minimal impact on the city budget and protected New Yorkers’
privacy rights from the get-go. Instead, the city traded its citizens’
rights to a for-profit company deeply immersed in the surveillance
economy.263 Ironically, it is not even clear that LinkNYC helped the

259. Kofman, supra note 5. Kofman also notes that “according to documents
obtained by ReCode, Sidewalk Labs is selling kiosks to other cities that will be able
to ‘monitor pedestrian, bike and car traffic, track passing wireless devices, listen to
street noise and use the kiosks’ built-in video cameras to identify abandoned
packages.’” Id.
260. City’s Public Wi-Fi Raises Privacy Concerns, supra note 258.
261. See infra Section III.B.iv.
262. Google City: How the Tech Juggernaut Is Reimagining Cities, INFO. (Apr. 5,
2016), https://vimeo.com/161980906 [https://perma.cc/3R69-UR36]. We discuss this
new form of data extraction from the physical world in greater detail below in the
context of Sidewalk Lab’s Quayside project in Toronto. See infra Section III.B.iv.
263. Aaron Shapiro calls this a Faustian bargain — between free Wi-Fi and the
privatization of urban data for profit. See Aaron Shapiro, Design, Control, Predict:
Cultural Politics in the Actually Existing Smart City (2018) (unpublished Ph.D.
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city achieve its goal of reducing the digital divide. As it happens,
Sidewalk Labs located the LinkNYC kiosks mainly in high traffic
touristy areas of Manhattan (which generate the highest advertising
revenues) rather than in poorer residential neighborhoods in the
outer boroughs.264 Of course, at the end of the day, LinkNYC and its
boosters can always fall back on the argument that those who object
to the kiosks are welcome not to use them. But this is a false
dichotomy based on an illusory choice. What it really amounts to is
forcing citizens to comply with the (private) terms and conditions of
their own surveillance or to stay off the (public) streets. As Nick
Pinto points out, “there is a different issue at play here: the right of
the City of New York to surrender [citizens’] data for us[.]”265

ii. Coercing Data Sharing in the Sharing Economy
At first glance, one might expect cities to encourage data-driven
companies of the sharing economy to operate in their territory: above
all, the shared economy epitomizes the cosmopolitan spirit,
innovation, and modernity. As Daniel Rach and David Schleicher
note, “the presence of bike-or car-or home-sharing services conveys
something important about how progressive, how technologically
advanced, and indeed how ‘world class’ a city is.”266 Presence does
not necessarily mean the lack of any regulation, however.267 When
cities interact with data-intense companies to design their urban
spaces, the quest to improve municipal services, whether
well-intended or catering to the incumbent industry’s interests,268 may
leave them indifferent to privacy issues.

dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Library)
264. See, e.g., Greg B. Smith, De Blasio’s Wi-Fi Plan Gives Slower Service to
Poorer
Neighborhoods,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS
(Nov.
24,
2014),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/exclusive-de-blasio-wi-fi-plan-slower-poor-na
bes-article-1.2021146 [https://perma.cc/J6DP-A3MB]; T.C. Sottek, New York City’s
Ambitious Free Wi-Fi Plan Sounds Great, Unless You Live in a Poor Neighborhood,
VERGE
(Nov.
24,
2014),
https://www.theverge.com/2014/11/24/7275567/nyc-public-wifi-is-rich
[https://perma.cc/E3J5-QNGA].
265. Pinto, supra note 257.
266. See Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local
Government Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76
O HIO S T . L.J. 901, 946 (2015).
267. Id. at 906–09 (arguing that cities will regulate the shared economy by
providing subsidies to companies, promoting redistributive measures and co-opting
them in exchange for municipal services).
268. Id. at 962–63
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New York City offers several case studies of privacy-related
tensions between the city government and the sharing economy. For
example, New York City’s powerful Taxi and Limousine Commission
(TLC) has long required ride-hailing firms to provide the agency with
information such as pick-up times and locations, license plate
numbers, and base information. In May 2016, however, the TLC
issued a “driver fatigue rule” that additionally required such firms
(including Uber, its competitors, and other for-hire vehicles like black
limos) to share more granular information, including the duration and
destinations of drivers’ trips.269 Uber objected on both privacy and
trade-secret grounds and even tried to avoid the rule by releasing a
free tool allowing cities and developers to track car travel times.270
Uber based its objections in part on a prior slip up in which the TLC
released a dataset that contained identifiable information about
yellow taxi trips, allowing civic hackers to deanonymize the released
data and, by combining it with paparazzi photos of celebrities, figure
out exactly which restaurants they visited and whether they added a
tip to their taxi fare.271 Despite these concerns, the TLC proceeded
with the new rule and, to the delight of city transportation planners,
as of February 1, 2019, ride-share companies must provide the TLC
with “the date, time, and location of pickups and drop-offs (at least
down to the intersection), the vehicle’s license number, the trip
mileage, itemized trip fare, route (including whether the vehicle
entered traffic-choked Midtown), and how much the driver was
paid.”272

269. See Vincent Barone, Uber, NYC at Odds Over Data Collection for New
Rule,
AM
N.Y.
(Dec.
5,
2016),
https://www.amny.com/transit/uber-nyc-at-odds-over-data-collection-for-new-safety-r
ule-1.12707850 [https://perma.cc/ATJ2-7ZZQ]. The rule addressed driver fatigue by
prohibiting all drivers from picking up passengers for more than 12 hours in any
24-hour period and more than 72 hours in any seven-day period. See Vincent Barone,
NYC Introduces New Taxi Rules to Keep Tired Drivers Off the Streets, AM N.Y.
(May
24,
2016),
https://www.amny.com/transit/nyc-introduces-new-taxi-rules-to-keep-tired-drivers-off
-the-streets-1.11836141/ [https://perma.cc/GKA3-FQ7M].
270. See Aarian Marshall, The Secret Uber Data That Could Fix Your Commute,
(Feb.
3,
2017,
10:00
AM),
WIRED
https://www.wired.com/2017/02/ubers-coughing-data-nyc-fix-commute/
[https://perma.cc/9KU3-XESM].
271. See J.K. Trotter, Public NYC Taxicab Database Lets You See How
GAWKER
(Oct.
23,
2014,
12:00
PM),
Celebrities
Tip,
https://gawker.com/the-public-nyc-taxicab-database-that-accidentally-track-16467245
46 [https://perma.cc/44KQ-57JW].
272. See Aarian Marshall, NYC Now Knows More Than Ever about Your Uber
and
Lyft
Trips,
WIRED
(Jan.
21,
2019,
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PM),
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In demanding this information, the TLC showed a near-perfect
disregard for data stewardship. As Albert Gidari noted:
The Commission conducted no privacy impact assessment;
considered no alternatives with lesser privacy impacts; and failed to
inform the public how long it would keep the data, with what other
government agencies it would share it and for what purposes, or to
whom it would disclose it such as in response to public records act
requests or for commercial use. The Commission has no privacy
officer and no privacy policy to govern its conduct. It is accountable
to no one.273

New York City regulators have also taken an aggressive stance
toward collecting data from home-sharing platforms such as Airbnb,
which enable hosts to list their apartments for short-term rentals.
Worried about the impact of removing these apartments from the
long-term rental market, the availability of affordable housing and
the deterioration in residential peace and quiet from a constant
stream of visitors, the New York City Council enacted a ban on
short-term apartment rentals in residential buildings with three or
more units.274 This law proved hard to enforce for the obvious
reason that the Airbnb website “does not display the real names and
addresses of its hosts,” making it extremely difficult for enforcement
agencies to “access a comprehensive list of Airbnb hosts in the
city.”275 In the face of pervasive disregard of this law by Airbnb
hosts,276 the City Council then passed Local Law 146, requiring
home-sharing firms to turn over voluminous monthly data regarding
the rental activity of their customers (“hosts”); this included both
personally identifying information and financial data and imposed
large penalties on firms that failed to comply.277 Airbnb and its
competitor HomeAway then filed suit against the city seeking to
enjoin enforcement of the ordinance on two main grounds: first, that

https://www.wired.com/story/nyc-uber-lyft-ride-hail-data/
[https://perma.cc/2PWK-SE8H].
273. Albert Gidari, “Smart Cities” Are Too Smart for Your Privacy, CTR. FOR
INTERNET
&
SOC’Y
(Feb.
20,
2017,
5:39
PM),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2017/02/smart-cities-are-too-smart-your-privacy
[https://perma.cc/6X3K-PS5B].
274. See generally Tess Hofmann, Note, Airbnb in New York City: Whose Privacy
Rights Are Threatened by a Government Data Grab?, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2589
(2019).
275. Id. at 2596 (citation omitted).
276. Id. at 2597 (citing a report by the New York State Attorney General that
indicates that “72 percent of units booked as short-term rentals on Airbnb violated
the ban on renting entire homes for fewer than thirty days.”).
277. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 26-2101–05 (McKinney 2019).
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the ordinance violated the Fourth Amendment by compelling them to
turn over protected business records without any opportunity for
pre-compliance review before a neutral decisionmaker; and, second,
that it conflicted with (and is preempted by) the Stored
Communications Act (SCA) by requiring home-sharing platforms to
divulge information about customers without a subpoena or other
legal process as required by the SCA.278 The Southern District of
New York court granted their request for a preliminary injunction,
finding that the large scale collection of private business records
“unsupported by individualized suspicion or any tailored
justification” fails to qualify as a reasonable search and seizure.279
In reaching its decision, the Southern District court relied heavily
on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Patel v. Los Angeles, in which a
Los Angeles ordinance was found facially invalid under the Fourth
Amendment for requiring hotel operators to record, maintain and
make available for inspection by the police certain personal
information about guests.280 The court reasoned that just like a hotel,
a home-sharing platform has two strong reasons to keep host and
guest data private. One is competitive; the other involves the
promotion of better customer relations.281 The court also rejected the
city’s argument that the platforms’ privacy interests in their
customers’ records were diminished due to the permissiveness of
“administrative searches” in other industries.282 Since the hotel
industry does not involve inherently dangerous operations, the court
was reluctant to extend precedents from more regulated industries to
the present context.283 After finding the ordinance within the scope
of the Fourth Amendment, the court then analyzed whether the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard was met. The court
reasoned that under the Fourth Amendment, administrative searches
of commercial establishments required individualized suspicion for
the search and an opportunity for a pre-compliance review before a
neutral decisionmaker.284 It concluded that:
In its sweep, the Ordinance dwarfs that of the Los Angeles
ordinance at issue in Patel. The universality of the [New York City]
Ordinance’s monthly production demand (covering all short-term

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, 373 F. Supp. 3d 467, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Id. at 492.

Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2447 (2015).

See Airbnb, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 3d at 484.
Id. at 485.
Id.
Id. at 487–90.
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rentals in New York City), the sheer volume of guest records
implicated, and the Ordinance’s infinite time horizon all disfavour
the Ordinance when evaluated for reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment.285

In addition to these privacy concerns, this approach is also an
example of Richard Schragger’s emphasis on agglomeration effects,
which are more likely to occur in big cities. Instead of choosing to
leave New York City for less regulated markets, Airbnb decided to
stay and invest in a legal battle. Conversely, a few years back, Uber
and Lyft chose to leave Austin, Texas, when the city introduced
fingerprint-based background checks and other data reporting
requirements on all hail-riding drivers in the city.286 Uber and Lyft
only returned — to the detriment of a locally grown alternative
non-profit ride-share — when Texas overrode Austin’s effort, passing
a regulation requiring licensing of the service against a fee on the
state level.287 Disempowered by legal constraints on regulating their
urban spaces, cities sometimes turn to data regulation — with varying
degrees of privacy intrusion.288
After reviewing the current Airbnb litigation, this Article now
turns to more collaborative forms of data sharing between cities and
tech firms, focusing on a privacy-friendly-model spearheaded in
Seattle.

iii. Collaborative Data Trusts
New York City resorted to a government data grab to gain access
to ride- and home-sharing data from industry leaders. But other cities
have followed a different path. For example, in January 2015, Uber
agreed to provide Boston with “anonymous data about the duration,

285. Id. at 491. Although the court’s main objection to the Ordinance was that it
seemed to invite a fishing expedition, it also evoked the reasoning in the recently
decided Carpenter case, stressing that “the test of reasonableness” under the Fourth
Amendment “is not whether an investigative practice maximizes law enforcement
efficacy” but rather must also balance other factors such as the extent of the intrusion
on protected privacy interests. Id. at 492 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2206, 2217–18 (2018)).
286. Associated Press, Uber and Lyft Return to Austin after Texas Law Kills the
City’s Fingerprint Rule, L.A. TIMES (May 29, 2017, 12:05 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-uber-austin-20170529-story.html
[https://perma.cc/68D6-4EPM].
287. Id.
288. See MEG YOUNG ET AL., BEYOND OPEN VS. CLOSED: BALANCING INDIVIDUAL
PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN DATA SHARING (2019),
https://faculty.washington.edu/billhowe/publications/pdfs/young_open_v_closed_semi
_synthetic_data.pdf [https://perma.cc/ASV2-U6WY].
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general locations, and times of rides that start or end in the city” on a
quarterly basis.289 A year later, Boston city officials expressed some
frustration at both Uber’s refusal to allow data sharing with a regional
planning agency and the utility for planning purposes of the
underlying data.290 In a nutshell, data sets limited to trips’ start and
end locations by zip codes did not allow “for analysis of how
proximity to public transit affects Uber usage, or how a new building
affects transportation patterns.”291 Where cooperative partnerships
have had the most success to date is in the bike-sharing industry.
Both New York City and Boston worked out arrangements with the
operators of Citi Bike and Blue Bike, respectively, to make some ride
data publicly available subject to a data license agreement that
imposes a number of privacy-related restrictions.292 Seattle has taken
an even more innovative approach to cooperative data sharing. A
proper analysis of the Seattle approach requires some background
information on data trusts and their potential use in balancing the
competing interests of cities, sharing economy firms, and local citizens
and customers.
Data trusts are intended to create a fiduciary relationship between
a trustee and a beneficiary, such that the former is under a duty to act
for the benefit of the latter according to the particular terms of the
trust.293 For example, a group of Fitbit and Apple Watch users might

289. Nicole Dungca, In First, Uber to Share Ride Data with Boston, BOS. GLOBE
(Jan.
14,
2015,
5:33
AM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/01/13/uber-share-ridership-data-with-bos
ton/4Klo40KZREtQ7jkoaZjoNN/story.html [https://perma.cc/29MT-9CB9] (noting
that the ride-share data from Uber “would be stripped of identifying information and
exact locations”). The agreement stipulated that this information was confidential
and constituted Uber’s trade secrets under the state public records law, thereby
exempting it from disclosure; it also limited sharing such information beyond the city
government without Uber’s approval. See Uber Technologies Inc.-City of Boston
Agreement on the Provision of Uber City Data (Jan. 12. 2015) available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1513002-final-city-data-agreement-bosto
n-uber-011215.html [https://perma.cc/QH22-N8R8].
290. See Adam Vaccaro, Highly Touted Boston-Uber Partnership Has Not Lived
Up
to
Hype
So
Far,
BOSTON.COM
(June
16,
2016),
https://www.boston.com/news/business/2016/06/16/bostons-uber-partnership-has-not-l
ived-up-to-promise [https://perma.cc/4NA7-SM3B].
291. Id.
292. See,
e.g.,
Motivate
Data
License
Agreement,
BLUEBIKES,
https://www.bluebikes.com/data-license-agreement
[https://perma.cc/37AK-BD4B]
(last visited May 26, 2020); CitiBike Data License Agreement, CITI BIKE,
https://www.citibikenyc.com/data-sharing-policy [https://perma.cc/QP3P-HQU6] (last
visited Mar. 13, 2020).
293. See Sylvie Delacroix & Neil D. Lawrence, Bottom-Up Data Trusts:
Disturbing the ‘One Size Fits All’ Approach to Data Governance, 9 INT’L DATA
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agree to pool their medical data in a data trust with explicit terms for
how the trustee may share the data for medical research purposes —
subject to various limitations set out in advance, and to the trustee’s
independent judgment of which uses uphold the interests of the users.
The benefits of such a trust structure are threefold. First, in the
typical scenario in today’s digital world, data controllers amass huge
amounts of data about data subjects who have limited understanding
of how controllers may use their data and almost no power to avoid
unwanted or harmful uses.294 In sharp contrast, the legal structure of
a data trust guarantees that trustees manage beneficiaries’ data
according to the terms of the trust and subject to a legally enforceable
fiduciary obligation.295 Second, whereas data controllers seek to
maximize the value of the personal data they collect for the benefit of
shareholders, trustees owe a duty of undivided loyalty, requiring them
to maintain their independence from profit-maximizing activities.296
Finally, trust instruments are highly flexible and therefore allow a
wide variety of data sharing policies, thereby providing data subjects a
range of choices that reflect their own values and needs in a given
context.297 That said, a trust structure has certain disadvantages,
including daunting implementation challenges. Sylvie Delacroix and
Neil Lawrence identify two issues requiring special attention: uptake
(i.e., how to educate potential users about the benefits of data trusts)
and exit procedures (i.e., how to identify all data associated with a
user wishing to leave a data trust).298
A 2016 article by internet scholars Jack Balkin and Jonathan
Zittrain popularized the idea of imposing a general fiduciary duty on
Their
service providers like Google, Facebook, and Uber.299

PRIVACY L. 236, 240–41 (2019) (noting that in a data trust, data subjects tend to act as
both settlors and beneficiaries).
294. Id. at 239.
295. Id. at 241 (noting that if a dispute arises over a trustee’s conduct, the burden
of proof is on trustees to demonstrate that “they have sought to promote the
beneficiaries’ interests with appropriate degrees of impartiality, prudence,
transparency and undivided loyalty”).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 251; CHRIS REED, BPE SOLICITORS & PINSENT MASONS, DATA TRUSTS:
LEGAL
AND
GOVERNANCE
CONSIDERATIONS
8
(2019),
https://theodi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/General-legal-report-on-data-trust.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YNS9-7AAV] (explaining how a recent report commissioned by the
Open Data Institute finds even more severe problems with data trusts and concludes
that “[t]rust law is not an appropriate legal structure for data trusts”).
299. Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech
Companies
Trustworthy,
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
3,
2016),
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argument turns on a provocative analogy between doctors, lawyers,
and accountants, who are required by law to act in good faith towards
their clients, and firms in the information industry that supposedly
have many of the trappings of fiduciaries. The main shortcoming of
their analysis is that it offers no compelling arguments as to why such
firms would agree to assume fiduciary duties on a voluntary basis.300
Of course, this problem is surmountable if Congress or state
legislatures enact appropriate legislation imposing such duties on
information-intensive firms.301 Otherwise, the idea of information
fiduciaries seems like a non-starter for the private sector.
But this is not the case for city governments. Despite the mixed
reception of data trusts in the scholarly literature,302 a few cities have
proactively partnered with universities to develop trust-based
infrastructures for managing sharing economy data in the public
interest. One major difference between these efforts and earlier
discussions of data trust is that instead of relying solely on the legal
structure of trust to achieve their goals, city-university partnerships
are adopting a techno-legal approach that incorporates sophisticated
technical infrastructure for ensuring the protection of data deposited
in the trust repository.
For example, in July 2017, Seattle began implementing a pilot
program for “dockless-bikes” under which bike-share operators had
two options for sharing granular data about their riders with the city:
they may provide the city with anonymized trip information as
specified in Seattle’s Bike Share Permit Requirements, or they may
share data under a signed agreement with the Transportation Data
Collaborative (TDC) located at the University of Washington
(UW).303 The TDC is a protected and linked data repository of
sensitive information from regional public and private transportation

https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346
/ [https://perma.cc/3LLC-ZABD].
300. Id. This article is based on earlier work by Balkin. See generally Jack M.
Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1183 (2016). For a critical assessment of Balkin’s ideas, see generally Lina M. Khan &
David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497
(2019).
301. On December 12, 2018, Senator Brian Schatz (D-HI) and a group of 15
Democratic senators introduced a bill that would impose duties of care, loyalty, and
confidentiality on online service providers with respect to processing and securing
user data. See Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018).
302. For a critical assessment, see generally Khan & Pozen, supra note 300.
303. See Seattle Bike Share Requirements, SEATTLE.GOV (June 30, 2017),
www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/SDOT/BikeProgram/BicycleSharePermit
Requirements.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CKT-AKUS].
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providers. It allows partnering agencies to create data-driven policy,
support research uses, and provide individuals with authenticated
access to their own transportation records.304 More specifically, the
TDC provides:
•

Policies and protocols that address data ownership, access, use,
and related privacy and ethics in the interest of partner
organizations and the persons represented by the data, supported
by the UW’s Urban Infrastructure Lab;

•

A neutral third-party host with transportation expertise (the
Washington State Transportation Center (TRAC)) to enable
data sharing and analysis;

•

Protection from disclosure under the Washington Public Records
Act via administrative, legal, and legislative efforts available to
the UW; and

•

A trusted data platform, which provides privacy and security
tools, such as encryption for sensitive attributes, data tagging to
track and audit the uses and users of data, and policy-based
encryption.305

A recent paper co-authored by TDC staff members at UW makes a
case for data collaboratives by observing that researchers and the
public are very poorly served by the usual dichotomy between open
(publicly available) and closed (proprietary) data systems.306
Institutions are reluctant to make “sensitive” data openly available to
researchers mainly on privacy and IP grounds, and therefore restrict
access to such data or its linkage with other data sets, thereby instead
sharing less interesting and useful information with the research
community.
As seen above, this tension is apparent in the
transportation sector, where city agencies want more granular access
to firm data than ride-hailing and bike-share firms wish to supply.
Building on their work in creating the TDC, the co-authors describe

304. See What Is the Transportation Data Collarborative?, UW TRANSP. DATA
COLLABORATIVE,
https://www.uwtdc.org/about [https://perma.cc/U3MV-V2EN]
(last visited Apr. 3, 2020).
305. See
Transportation
Data
Collaborative,
URBANALYTICS,
https://urbanalytics.uw.edu/projects/transportationdatacollab/
[https://perma.cc/TQY9-ES5H] (last visited Apr. 3, 2020). Other university labs, most
notably the Governance Lab (GovLab) at New York University’s Tandon School of
Engineering, have also sponsored initiatives to create and validate data
collaboratives. See Stefaan Verhulst, Data Collaboratives Can Transform the Way
Civil Society Organisations Find Solutions, LIVING LIBR. (Feb. 22, 2018),
https://thelivinglib.org/data-collaboratives-can-transform-the-way-civil-society-organi
sations-find-solutions [https://perma.cc/S6K9-B7NF].
306. See YOUNG ET AL., supra note 288.
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the design of a “legal-technical infrastructure” they call Collaborative
Data Trusts (CDTs), which they offer as an alternative to the open
versus closed data dichotomy.307
One important way in which the UW data trust achieves privacy
goals is by relying on differential privacy and synthetic datasets, which
allow for the responsible use of sensitive data by removing causal
relationships between variables (basically adding noise to prevent
re-identification) while preserving relationships in all other cases
(thereby preserving utility).308 The use of customized synthetic
datasets also allows researchers to remove signals that could expose
proprietary data (and hence competitive advantage for the data
providers) or preserve biases that could reinforce discriminatory
policies.309 Finally, the integrated techno-legal infrastructure utilizes
data sharing and use agreements to specify in advance the data to be
shared, the scope of research, and the legal recourse of the data trust
if data quality is deficient and of the data sources in the event of
unauthorized disclosure.310 Data trusts hold enormous promise for
cities engaged in data management activities. They enable city
governments to maintain their role as data stewards while benefiting
from data-driven activities, even as they interact with the private
sector in a highly collaborative manner.311

iv. From Data Sharing to Toronto’s Outsourcing of Data Governance
The largest and most controversial smart city project in which data
trusts play a prominent role is Sidewalk Lab’s efforts to build a smart
city of the future in Toronto.312 In the spring of 2017, Waterfront

307. See id. For a very similar approach, see Lisa M. Austin & David Lie, Safe
Sharing Sites, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 581, 584–85 (2019).
308. YOUNG ET AL., supra note 288.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Shortly before publication of this Article, Sidewalk Labs announced that it
was no longer pursuing this project, attributing its decision to the “unprecedented
economic uncertainty” both worldwide and in the Toronto real estate market. See
Daniel L. Doctoroff, Why We’re No Longer Pursuing the Quayside Project — And
MEDIUM
(May
7,
2020),
What’s
Next
for
Sidewalk
Labs,
https://medium.com/sidewalk-talk/why-were-no-longer-pursuing-the-quayside-project
-and-what-s-next-for-sidewalk-labs-9a61de3fee3
[https://perma.cc/T8U5-WA2J].
Doctoroff (Sidewalk Labs’ CEO) also stated that the ideas developed in the
Quayside project “represent a meaningful contribution to the work of tackling big
urban problems, particularly in the areas of affordability and sustainability. This is a
vital societal endeavor, and Sidewalk Labs will continue our work to contribute to it.”
Id. Thus, despite the demise of Sidewalk Labs role, the Quayside project remains an
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Toronto (WT), a Canadian redevelopment agency established in 2002
by the government of Canada, the government of Ontario, and the
city of Toronto to oversee the revitalization of Toronto’s eastern
waterfront, issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Quayside
Development project.313 It sought an “Innovation and Funding
Partner” to help create and fund “a globally-significant community
that will showcase advanced technologies, building materials,
sustainable practices[,] and innovative business models that
demonstrate pragmatic solutions toward climate-positive urban
development.”314 Six weeks later — a rather short time for an RFP of
such complexity — WT selected Sidewalk Labs.315
In the fall of 2017, WT and Sidewalk Labs signed a Framework
Agreement for what many now referred to as the “Sidewalk Toronto”
project. This agreement generated criticism and controversy mostly
due to the secrecy over the full agreement. Only a summary was ever

important learning experience for cities, urban innovation firms, and information law
scholars.
313. See WATERFRONT TORONTO, REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS: INNOVATION AND
FUNDING PARTNER FOR THE QUAYSIDE DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITY 6 (2017),
https://storage.googleapis.com/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/1321
4337/Waterfront-Toronto-RFP-No.-2017-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R37-F9Z5]. By
2015, WT was approaching the end of its 20-year lifespan. Although it lacked
borrowing authority or the capacity to create subsidiaries due to restrictions in its
enabling act, it owned a 12-acre waterfront parcel on Lake Ontario known as
“Quayside” and decided to make it the showpiece of a new, second phase of
waterfront revitalization. Id.; see also CITY OF TORONTO, STAFF REPORT FOR ACTION
ON WATERFRONT STRATEGIC REVIEW TO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 1–4 (2015),
https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2015/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-81763.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J5ZX-SLXH]. See generally Ellen P. Goodman & Julia Powles,
Urbanism Under Google: Lessons from Sidewalk Toronto, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 457
(2019).
314. WATERFRONT TORONTO, REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS: INNOVATION AND
FUNDING PARTNER FOR THE QUAYSIDE DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITY (2017),
https://storage.googleapis.com/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/1321
4337/Waterfront-Toronto-RFP-No.-2017-13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6R37-F9Z5]
(explaining how WT viewed Quayside as potentially a “national and global model”
and it fully intended to expand the project to an adjacent 880-acre waterfront site
owned by the City of Toronto and known as the Port Lands public redevelopment
area).
315. A report by the Ontario Auditor General subsequently criticized the selection
process, noting that Sidewalk Labs was chosen precipitously and without adequate
consultation with government. See generally Marianna Valverde & Alexandra Flynn,

Mystery on the Waterfront: How the “Smart City” Allure Led a Major Public
Agency in Toronto into a Reckless Deal with Big Tech, CENTRE FOR FREE
EXPRESSION
(Dec.
3,
2018),
https://cfe.ryerson.ca/blog/2018/12/mystery-waterfront-how-smart-city-allure-led-maj
or-public-agency-toronto-reckless-deal [https://perma.cc/HZK8-F592] (describing
intense lobbying efforts by Sidewalk Labs and related companies).
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published, and it failed to clarify key terms and concepts regarding
data ownership and digital governance.316 Over the next year,
Sidewalk Labs took the lead in convening an advisory board and
holding public consultations with very limited participation by any
city officials.317 But prominent privacy experts eventually resigned
from their role as company consultants or advisory board members.318
With this background in mind, the remainder of this Section
examines Sidewalk Labs’ original data governance and privacy
proposal for Sidewalk Toronto as set out in its Master Innovation and
Development Plan, a three-volume, 1500-page document issued in
June 2019.319 In a chapter devoted to “Digital Innovation,” the firm
proposed the creation of an independent “trust” with broad authority
over data governance issues within both Quayside and the much
larger adjacent site that Sidewalk Labs refers to in toto as the “IDEA
District.”320 In a nutshell, the proposed Urban Data Trust (UDT)
would establish privacy guidelines and a related assessment process
administered by its Chief Data Officer who reviews and approves
projects using data collected in the physical environment of the IDEA
District.
In developing a “trusted process for responsible data use,”
Sidewalk Labs sought to respond to three concerns raised during the
public consultations: first, that data collection in the public realm
amounted to a form of surveillance; second, that the collection and

316. See generally Goodman & Powles, supra note 313.
317. See Valverde & Flynn, supra note 315.
318. See Gabrielle Canon, ‘City of Surveillance’: Privacy Expert Quits Toronto’s
Smart-City
Project,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
23,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/23/toronto-smart-city-surveillance-ann-c
avoukian-resigns-privacy [https://perma.cc/X7RH-8A5T]. Saadia Muzaffar, a tech
expert and founder of TechGirls Canada, stepped down because Sidewalk Toronto
“was not adequately addressing privacy issues” she and others had raised. Id. And
former Ontario Privacy Commissioner Ann Cavoukian resigned after learning that
“third parties could access identifiable information” gathered in the Quayside
district. Id.
319. SIDEWALK LABS, MASTER INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN: CHAPTER 5
376–466
(2019),
https://quaysideto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/MIDP-Volume-2-Chapter-5-Digital
-Innovation-Accessible.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3QP-AL36]. This chapter builds upon
and refines Sidewalk Labs’ earlier discussions of a digital governance framework. See
Alyssa Harvey Dawson, Digital Governance Proposals for DSAP Consultation,
SIDEWALK
LABS
13–17
(Oct.
16,
2018),
https://storage.googleapis.com/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2022
3247/Digital-Governance-Proposals-for-DSAP-Consultation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DMU7-YUGZ].
320. See SIDEWALK LABS, supra note 319, at 378–79.
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use of such data should be treated as a public resource (provided
privacy risks have been addressed) and not solely benefit the private
or public sector; and, third, that Sidewalk Labs should not enjoy any
special advantages in developing the core digital services for the
IDEA District.321 The company sought to address these concerns by
creating a new category of “urban data” (defined as “information
gathered in the city’s public realm, its publicly accessible spaces, and
even some private buildings”)322 and giving it additional privacy
protections by treating urban data as a “collective” asset that would
not be owned “in the traditional sense” but rather managed by an
independent entity (the UDT) and made publicly accessible by
default; and applying consistent processes and guidelines to all
entities collecting urban data in the district including Sidewalk Labs.
While this strategy sounds reasonable at first glance, it suffers from
many shortcomings. The most severe among them is a democratic
deficit or lack of political legitimacy.
To begin with, the RFP called upon the partner to work closely
with WT in creating “the required governance constructs to stimulate
the growth of an urban innovation cluster, including legal frameworks
(e.g., Intellectual Property, privacy, data sharing)[.]”323 As many
commentators have observed, it is highly problematic for a vendor “to
propose the structure, operation, and regulatory power” of the
governing entity with authority over the vendor.324 WT should have
set the governance rules for data collected in public spaces that it
owned and controlled instead of allowing the proverbial fox to guard
the henhouse.
A lack of legitimacy also undermines Sidewalk Lab’s conception of
a data trust. According to the MIDP, the final agreement between
WT and Sidewalk Labs would set up the structure of the UDT and

321. Id. at 416–18.
322. Id. at 377. The distinguishing features of urban data include its connection to a
specific physical environment and the difficulty of obtaining informed consent for its
collection from individuals as they transit public spaces. This makes urban data
different from “more traditional forms of data, termed here ‘transaction data,’ in
which individuals affirmatively — albeit with varying levels of understanding —
provide information about themselves through websites, mobile phones, or paper
documents.” Id. at 416.
323. WATERFRONT TORONTO, supra note 313, at 17.
324. Natasha Tusikov, “Urban Data” & “Civic Data Trusts” in the Smart City,
CTR.
FOR
FREE
EXPRESSION
(Aug.
6,
2019),
https://cfe.ryerson.ca/blog/2019/08/%E2%80%9Curban-data%E2%80%9D-%E2%80
%9Ccivic-data-trusts%E2%80%9D-smart-city [https://perma.cc/UZ5C-MG64]; see
also Goodman & Powles, supra note 313, at 474 (asking “why is a vendor making
policy?”).
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authorize the creation of a non-profit entity with “the charter to
address the digital governance challenges related to urban data while
also promoting data-driven innovations that benefit individuals and
society.”325 This oversight entity would have a five-member board
(drawn from various sectors) and a Chief Data Officer (CDO)
responsible for developing the UDT charter, promulgating
“Responsible Data Use (RDU) Guidelines,” and structuring
oversight and review processes. Subject to the oversight board’s
approval, the CDO would also determine how the entity would be
staffed, operated, funded, and perform various other tasks.326
Although Sidewalk Labs offers a number of ideas for ensuring the
board’s independence and avoiding conflicts of interest, it is silent as
to the basics of governance such as who appoints board members,
their qualifications and the necessary expertise in relation to their
defined tasks, the board’s procedures for handling complaints about
the CDO’s policy decisions, or their powers of enforcement.
Additionally, it has very little to say about the sources of funding for
the UDT or what happens if, down the road, Sidewalk Labs walks
away from the project.
This lack of legitimacy has two probable consequences for
Sidewalk Labs’ data governance proposal. First, although the RDU
Guidelines incorporate well-established privacy principles and outline
an RDU Assessment process covering any collection or use of urban
data,327 it is not at all clear how the CDO will handle the difficult
choices he or she will likely encounter. For example, will the CDO
balance risks and benefits in the public or corporate interest? As
Sean McDonald notes, “[t]he Urban Data Trust is likely to have to
weather a significant amount of political and financial pressures,
which is a challenge for any institution — let alone one trying to
maintain the public’s interest in data governance amidst financial
dependence.”328 This suggests that the UDT will have to draw on its

325. SIDEWALK LABS, supra note 319, at 420.
326. Id. at 420–21.
327. The assessment process considers the purpose of the project, the data sources
(including questions of storage, access, and transfer), legal compliance, and
risk-benefit analysis. The CDO weighs these factors and then makes a final decision,
denying, approving, or approving with conditions. See id. at 420. Overall, this process
is quite similar to the familiar concept of Privacy Impact Assessments, although it is
somewhat broader given its attention to the ethical implications of artificial
intelligence.
328. Sean McDonald, MIDP: The Data Governance Proposal, MEDIUM (June 26,
2019), https://medium.com/swlh/midp-the-data-governance-proposal-55272767dd40
[https://perma.cc/7D5R-YWDW].
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political capital to maintain its independence, but in reality, it will
have very little capital to draw upon.
Second, this democratic deficit leaves Sidewalk Labs in a weak
position to mitigate any controversies resulting from its creation of a
new category of urban data. The company asserts that it heard public
concerns over the collection of such data and responded by laying out
the guidelines and assessment process described above.329 Absent
from this response is any discussion of simply restricting the collection
of urban data or strengthening Canadian privacy law.330
Unsurprisingly, critics have dismissed the very notion of urban data as
“an elaborate contortion aimed at giving Sidewalk Labs the
regulatory cover it needs to collect data without consent in public
places that it quasi-owns.”331 Nor does Sidewalk Labs allay these
concerns by emphasizing open standards and open data. To its credit,
the company offers a plan to ensure a digitally open city. This plan is
laudable, yet it seems disingenuous given that Sidewalk Labs already
enjoys advantages that few other companies can ever match, even if
Quayside achieves the status of a digitally open city. These include
deep expertise with collecting and using urban data, ownership
interests or investments in other companies that have already
developed many of the tools needed to make Quayside successful,332
and access to the financial resources and technical sophistication of its
multibillion-dollar sister firm, Google.
Following the release of the MIDP, the chair of WT issued an open
letter identifying concerns with the size, scope, and funding of
Sidewalk Labs proposal, and seeking additional information on data
governance issues.333 On October 31, 2019, the chair released a
second open letter announcing that the parties had reached
“alignment” on these and other “threshold issues” based on Sidewalk
Labs confirmation that it would scale back the proposal from the
329. See SIDEWALK LABS, supra note 319, at 416.
330. See Tusikov, supra note 324.
331. McDonald, supra note 328; see also Goodman & Powles, supra note 313, at
472 (explaining how “it is notable that the trust mechanism envisaged no limits on
data collection or use, nor did it ensure that there will be surveillance-free zones.”).
332. These include Flow Inc. (which makes a traffic-management system);
Intersection (which makes public Wi-Fi networks); and Cityblock Health, Inc. (which
delivers innovative healthcare to low-income neighborhoods). See Valverde & Flynn,
supra note 315.
333. See Stephen Diamond, Open Letter from Waterfront Toronto Board Chair,
Stephen Diamond Regarding Quayside, WATERFRONT TORONTO (June 24, 2019),
https://www.waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/portal/waterfront/Home/waterfronthome/newsr
oom/newsarchive/news/2019/june/open+letter+from+waterfront+toronto+board+cha
ir%2C+stephen+diamond+regarding+quayside [https://perma.cc/N3D9-L6VC].
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190-acre IDEA District to the original 12-acre Quayside site; switch
to a new, WT-led approach to data governance based on existing
Canadian privacy law; partner with other real estate developers
rather than act as lead developer and modify its revenue-sharing
plans with WT; and make various other concessions.334
The WT letter emphasizes that this compromise does not represent
a final agreement. Rather, it allows WT to proceed with the formal
evaluation of the MIDP subject to further public consultation and
assessment with a final decision anticipated by March 31, 2020. As to
data governance and privacy issues, Sidewalk Labs agreed that going
forward, WT will act as the lead on any future discussions with
governmental entities; comply with all existing and future privacy
legislation, regulations, and policy framework; accept that relevant
municipal provisions and federal laws will determine data
governance; store all personal information collected in its digital
operations within Canada; and not use “Urban Data” as a term and
otherwise eliminate the UDT from its proposal.335 As required by the
agreement on threshold issues, Sidewalk Labs very recently delivered
a Digital Innovation Appendix (DIA) that updates the MIDP and
will become the basis for formal evaluation of the project.336
In short, it is too soon to say how the Sidewalk Toronto project will
play out or even if it will move forward to the building stage.337 Still,

334. Stephen Diamond, Open Letter from Waterfront Toronto Board Chair,
WATERFRONT
TORONTO
(Oct.
31,
2019),
https://www.waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/portal/waterfront/Home/waterfronthome/newsr
oom/newsarchive/news/2019/october/open+letter+from+waterfront+toronto+board+
chair+-+october+31%2C+2019 [https://perma.cc/7VPD-M2N9]. For a summary of the
letter, see Nick Summers, Toronto Is Reining in Sidewalk Labs’ Smart City Dream,
(Oct.
31,
2019),
ENGADGET
https://www.engadget.com/2019/10/31/sidewalk-labs-waterfront-toronto-threshold-iss
ues/ [https://perma.cc/CQ2A-DFJ5].
335. See Letter from Waterfront Toronto to Sidewalk Labs 5–7 (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/wcm/connect/waterfront/86d92f81-20be-4029-a6
16-00522abbd34a/Threshold+Issues+Resolution+Documents.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
[https://perma.cc/J7Z5-JUEE].
336. SIDEWALK LABS, MASTER INNOVATION & DEVELOPMENT PLAN: DIGITAL
INNOVATION
APPENDIX
(2019),
https://storage.googleapis.com/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/1509
3613/Sidewalk-Labs-Digital-Innovation-Appendix.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7B6V-HBJD]; Sarah Wray, Sidewalk Labs Details Digital Systems,
Says It Won’t Sell Data or Use Facial Recognition, SMART CITIES WORLD (Nov. 19,
2019),
https://www.smartcitiesworld.net/news/news/sidewalk-labs-details-digital-systems-say
s-it-wont-sell-data-or-use-facial-recognition—4797 [https://perma.cc/K8DE-7AVV].
337. Quite apart from the question of WT’s ultimate approval, there is a lawsuit
pending that seeks to block the agreements between Sidewalk Labs and Waterfront
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we can speculate about why it shaped up the way it has. Richard
Schragger has described a market-based theory of local government
whose two key features — dependence on private investment and
competition for private investment with other municipalities —
results in “development and business-friendly policies.”338 Something
along these lines is no doubt at work with WT, a redevelopment
agency nearing the end of its mandate and its funding and lacking the
ability to borrow money. In Sidewalk Labs, WT found an ideal
partner, at least at the outset. From Alphabet’s point of view,
Sidewalk Toronto was the opportunity it had been looking for to
build a city “from ‘the Internet up.’” “What I mean by that,” writes
Sidewalk Labs CEO Dan Doctoroff, “is a place where ubiquitous
connectivity is truly built into the foundation of the city, and where
people use the data that’s generated to enhance quality of life.”339 In
The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, Shoshana Zuboff portrays the
marriage between development-favoring cities and the information
industry somewhat differently. For Zuboff, the industry’s relentless
drive for new sources of data leads inevitably to the “real” world, and
hence to the city as one of the few remaining virgin tracts for data
extraction and monetization. “Whether what even . . . Doctoroff . . .
refers to as a ‘Google city’ succeeds,” Zuboff notes, “the company has
interested the public by recasting our central gathering places as a
commercial operation in which once public-assets and functions are
reborn as the cornered raw materials earmarked for a new
marketplace.”340
In sum, the above case studies establish that cities vary widely in
their attitudes towards data stewardship and their dedication of
resources to building out programs that include all five components
identified by Finch and Tene (in brief, adoption of privacy principles,
the appointment of a privacy lead, risk management, vendor

Toronto in its entirety. See Donovan Vincent & Rob Ferguson, Civil Liberties Group
Launches Court Action to Stop Quayside, Says Canadians Should Not Be ‘Lab Rats’,
STAR
(Apr.
16,
2019),
https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2019/04/16/civil-liberties-group-launches-court-acti
on-to-stop-quayside-says-canadians-should-not-be-lab-rats.html
[https://perma.cc/VT6S-SCCV].
338. Richard Schragger, The Political Economy of City Power, 44 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 91, 96–98 (2017).
339. Daniel L. Doctoroff, Reimagining Cities from the Internet Up, MEDIUM (Nov.
30,
2016),
https://medium.com/sidewalk-talk/reimagining-cities-from-the-internet-up-5923d6be6
3ba [https://perma.cc/UG26-XARY].
340. ZUBOFF, supra note 79, at 228.
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management and ethical review of AI programs).341 Moreover, some
cities are quite inconsistent in their privacy awareness, depending on
their desired goals. For example, New York City’s local laws
protecting personal data held by city agencies is a model of data
stewardship with its strong embrace of privacy principles and internal
management programs using a risk-based approach. In sharp
contrast, the LinkNYC broadband initiative allows a private firm to
set the terms of engagement. While it may succeed in generating high
revenues for the city while providing Wi-Fi access to a small number
of residents, it scores a failing grade on all five components.
Similarly, New York City wanted and got sharing economy data from
the likes of Uber and Airbnb by relying on aggressive rulemaking
that sparked lawsuits. But in the process, it almost completely
disregarded data stewardship. Seattle and several other cities have
experimented with alternative approaches to data stewardship by
embracing the idea of data trusts, with Seattle demonstrating
leadership by developing both the technical and legal aspects of such
trusts. Finally, Toronto — a complex and ongoing saga of privacy in
the smart city — offered a plan that matched up very nicely with the
five components, in the sense that it checked every box. Toronto’s
government, however, had to fall on its sword and withdraw much of
its proposed plan when it became clear that the citizens of Toronto
would not stand for a private firm setting its own rules for governing
data in public (or quasi-public) spaces.
IV. THE RHETORIC OF BARCELONA: THE PROMISE OF A “PUBLIC”
SMART CITY

Critics of smart city solutions have pointed to the neoliberal turn
around which municipalities have started to converge worldwide.
The heart of the criticism goes into the very framing of the smart city
concept, dominated by a logic of inevitability and an aura of a
Can we reimagine the
self-evidently progressive project.342
relationship between technology companies and cities in which
technology is used for the benefit of citizens instead of big
companies? In which Sidewalk Labs does not use the data from
Quayside simply to perfect its AI but to build digital solutions that
promote citizen participation, help personalize services, and
de-bureaucratize national and local governments, all the while

341. See Finch & Tene, supra note 196, at 127–34.
342. See EVGENY MOROZOV & FRANCESCA BRIA, RETHINKING THE SMART CITY:
DEMOCRATIZING URBAN TECHNOLOGY 23–24 (2018).
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preserving privacy and creating a more enjoyable local environment
that stimulates growth? A Spanish city in Europe — Barcelona — is
now branding itself as the alternative smart city, one in which the
municipality retains control over critical urban infrastructure and
services.
Francisco Franco’s dictatorship in Spain in the 1940s–50s
epitomized centralism. Thereafter, the resurgent Basque and Catalan
nationalist movements were appeased with accentuating regionalism
in the 1978 Spanish Constitution — a move toward “non-institutional
federalism” that was based on the territorial division of the country
into 17 autonomous communities.343 By 2012, half of the Spanish
state spending was managed at a regional and municipal level, whilst
these two tiers of government also employed 70% of all state
Municipal governments were given wide
employees.344
responsibilities in areas as broad as land use, public utilities, sport,
transportation, and even childcare.345 Total local public expenditure
tripled during the years of economic expansion, that is, between 1993
and 2009.346 However, after a pan-European financial crisis, in 2010,
the Spanish model of deep decentralization came under severe
pressure. The initial reaction to the 2009 financial crisis of the
Spanish government was to draw up an expansionist program of €25
billion. The program, known as “Plan E,” involved funding projects
that were to be carried out by local governments, including small to
medium investments in infrastructure and other specific policies like
technological development. However, in May 2010, the central
government adopted a strict economic stability package in close
adherence to the criteria laid down by the European economic
authorities. This program sought to cut public debt from 9.2% of
GDP in 2010 to just 3% by 2013 and incorporated a wide range of
austerity measures that hit especially hard the local governments in
Spain.347

343. Andrew Dowling, A Tale of Two Cities: Barcelona and Madrid in Spain, in
CITIES AS POLITICAL OBJECTS: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION, ANALYTICAL
CATEGORIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES OF METROPOLITANIZATION 81
(Alistair Cole & Renaud Payre eds., 2016).
344. Id.
345. Carmen Navarro & Esther Panos, Spanish Local Government and the
Austerity Plan: In the Eye of the Perfect Storm, in LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES IN TIMES
OF AUSTERITY ACROSS MEDITERRANEAN EUROPE 102–03 (Andrea Lippi &
Theodore Tsekos eds., 2019).
346. Id. at 103.
347. Id. at 100.
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It is against this background that in 2015 Barcelona — the capital
of Catalonia and the second-largest city in the country — elected a
mayor with a radically progressive agenda centered around the
principle of data sovereignty. Ada Colau ran her first election
campaign with slogans on the re-municipalization of water and
energy, social housing, and promises about turning Barcelona into a
commons-based digital city built from the bottom-up.348 The Mayor’s
Committee on Digital Innovation came up with a Digital Plan, putting
emphasis on data ownership by the city, open-source code, and the
publication of a technology procurement handbook that specifies
contractual clauses mandating ethical standards — fostering a culture
of transparency that encourages whistleblowers against corruption
and crowdsourcing of ideas for dealing with urban problems.349
Francesca Bria, Barcelona’s Chief Digital Officer, has been called
“the Robin Hood of data.”350 Bria is also heading a European-funded
pilot project called DECODE (Decentralised Citizen-Owned Data
Ecosystems).351
Although privacy and data protection are enshrined as separate
human rights both on the level of European law352 and in the Spanish
Constitution,353 they have not been central to Barcelona’s vision of
data sovereignty. The newly enacted European statutory framework
that could potentially challenge the commodification of data — the
GDPR — allows the processing of personal data only when under a
348. See generally, MOROZOV & BRIA, supra note 342.
349. Dowling, supra note 343, at 92.
350. Amy Lewin, Barcelona’s Robin Hood of Data: Francesca Bria, SIFTED (Nov.
16, 2018), https://sifted.eu/articles/barcelonas-robin-hood-of-data-francesca-bria/
[https://perma.cc/HB86-Q9JZ]. The role of a Chief Digital Officer (CDO) is to
“convert traditional ‘analog’ operations to digitized systems.” See Kristin Musulin,

Why Cities Should Consider a Chief Digital Officer — Even If the C-Suite Is
Crowded,
SMART
CITIES
DIVE
(Aug.
23,
2018),

https://www.smartcitiesdive.com/news/cities-should-consider-chief-digital-officer/5306
25/ [https://perma.cc/86AR-82YY]. This position is a novelty in the European
context, however, so the responsibilities and general role of the Chief Digital Officer
for Barcelona will be shaped primarily by the initiatives of its first holder, Francesca
Bria.
351. DECODE, https://decodeproject.eu [https://perma.cc/PC79-DMHQ] (last
visited Mar. 16, 2020).
352. See generally Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 7 &
8, 2012 O.J. (C 326/02); see also Case C-293/12 & Case C-594/12, Digital Rights
Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Communications, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 238;
Case C-131/12, Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD),
2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 317; Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data
Protection Commissioner, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 650.
353. See Art. 18.1, 18.2, Constitución Española, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978
(Spain).
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legitimate basis. Furthermore, smart city business models that rely on
consent as a default legal basis (such as LinkNYC or Quayside to
some extent) may run into trouble given the high bar the GDPR
places on establishing that consent is valid. 354 For example, most
recently, the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) — the country’s
antitrust watchdog — partnered with data protection authorities in
other European countries to raise a legal challenge against Facebook
for abuse of its dominant position. The FCO claimed that the
all-embracing consent sought from Facebook users for the collection
of their personal data through third-party websites and applications
that are embedded in Facebook’s interface (e.g., through its “Like,”
“Share,” and “Login” buttons) did not meet the criteria for informed
consent because users were not made aware of the extent of
Facebook’s data-sharing practices.355 Moreover, in 2019 on data
protection grounds alone, in France, Google was fined €50 million for
breaching the GDPR requirements of “informed,” “specific,” and
“unambiguous” consent in providing personalized advertisements.356
At a recent conference, however, instead of referring to the GDPR,
Bria emphasized the advent of blockchain technology for ensuring the
privacy of Barcelona’s residents who contribute their personal data to
the city’s data commons.357 The statement chimes in with recent
academic interpretations that place blockchain technology outside the
scope of the GDPR.358 Future reliance on blockchain for the rollout
of smart city applications in Europe might thus mean that, in spite of
its differentiating rhetoric, the “European” data stewardship model
exemplified by Barcelona is, in fact, steadily converging with North
American data practices in the urban context.
In many ways, Europe and North America “remain two worlds
apart because of their very different understandings of the role that
the public and the private sector should play in society.”359 Since
354. See Council Regulation, 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) (EU).
355. Adrian Künzler, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of Zurich, Facebook
Under Investigation, Presentation at Yale Information Society Project (Sept. 3,
2019).
356. The CNIL’s Restricted Committee Imposes a Financial Penalty of 50 Million
CNIL
(Jan.
21,
2019),
Euros
Against
Google
LLC,
https://www.cnil.fr/en/cnils-restricted-committee-imposes-financial-penalty-50-million
-euros-against-google-llc [https://perma.cc/62DZ-Q5MS].
357. Smart Cities and Strategy for Digital Sovereignty, Pictet Talk (Jan 20)
(transcript on file with authors)
358. See Georgios Dimitropoulos, The Law of Blockchain, 94 WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020).
359. Bilyana Petkova, Privacy as Europe’s First Amendment, 25 EUR. L.J. 119, 153
(2019).
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Europeans place their trust in the public sector, a narrative centered
around public data ownership seems intuitively appealing to
European sensitivities, and in Spain, it was also embedded into the
discourse of local anti-austerity opposition. However, in June 2019,
Barcelona’s Mayor Colau was very narrowly reelected, and it remains
to be seen to what extent she can keep up with her bold electoral
promises and go beyond the rhetoric of Barcelona as a “neoliberal
city with a human face.”360 The idea of advancing public interest
goals through procurement seems well-intentioned, although
achieving purely public ownership of data generated through the use
of devices supplied by private companies might prove difficult.
Moreover, much like the synchronized action of state and city actors
in the United States that has a better chance of achieving regulatory
experimentation,
the
interlocking
nature
of
Spain’s
“non-institutional” federalism makes coordination and close
cooperation between the regional, provincial and municipal level
essential. With independence and nationalist demands (mostly in
rural Catalonia but increasingly spreading also in Barcelona)361
clashing with the urban agenda of Colau, the actual outcome of the
data sovereignty brand remains unsure.
CONCLUSION

Urbanization is here to stay, and so is the growing interest in the
City. Jane Jacob’s evergreen account of organic urban development
remains relevant in the era of technology-driven datafication:
“[C]ities may fairly be called natural economic generators of diversity
and natural economic incubators of new enterprises[.]”362 Privacy,
broadly conceptualized, becomes an intrinsic part of a global city’s
identity as it intersects with the social capital that characterizes big
cities — diversity and economic growth. This Article has sought to
blend insights from the literature on global cities, American
federalism, and localism studies, as well as on smart cities and privacy

360. See MOROZOV & BRIA, supra note 342, at 27–28.
361. In 2017, the Spanish Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional a
referendum law on independence in Catalonia, spurring a crisis that continues to this
See
S.T.C.,
Oct.
17,
2017
(No.
4334)
(Spain),
day.
https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/ResolucionesTraducidas/Ley%20referendum%
20ENGLISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB3S-TJVY]; see also David Gardner,
Autonomy
Under
Fire,
FIN.
TIMES
(Aug.
16,
2012),
https://www.ft.com/content/00d27e14-e63a-11e1-ac5f-00144feab49a
[https://perma.cc/HP7Y-8ERJ] (detailing Catalonia’s demands for fiscal autonomy in
the wake of the central government’s then austerity measures).
362. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 148.
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scholarship to show that U.S. cosmopolitan urbanism intersects
privacy activism with data stewardship.
First, cities use their legal arsenal to litigate under federal, state, or
city law in order to protect the personal information of their city
dwellers in a variety of contexts ranging from political participation to
consumer protection. Regardless of whether such experiments turn
out to be successful — and they sometimes may well be363 — cities’
privacy activism, likely amplified by the stance of their states, may
serve as a trigger for bipartisan policy debates and a catalyst for
enforcement. Second, regarding technology’s courtship with the city,
privacy may be respected to a certain degree by local agencies, but
privacy concerns increasingly give way to open data practices
worldwide. Privacy is also not a priority in emerging new business
models that monetize data and are facilitated through contract law.
But big cities can and should leverage their existing powers to push
hard for privacy-by-design in public procurement projects that may
jumpstart the market in privacy-preserving “smart” systems. Yet
what we observe across the board in large, cosmopolitan North
American cities is a tendency toward data stewardship with a wide
spectrum of approaches.
As data stewards, cities sometimes abdicate public power and
control over public spaces, behaving more like a commercial actor.
Toronto’s Quayside project is a harbinger of what we might be seeing
more often, albeit to a varying degree, across U.S. cities and
elsewhere. Surely the very nature of public spaces — open and
accessible to all, without a fee, without government restriction on
speech and assembly other than reasonable time, place, manner
restrictions, available for community and not privately owned —
seems to dictate that public authorities should oversee public spaces.
As we have seen, however, instead of relying on their police powers
as regulators of local-level broadband, housing, and transportation
services, some city governments either negotiate data-sharing
agreements that may bring them direct revenues or try to deal with
street-level problems through collecting ever more data. Privacy
issues in such cases need to be treated with caution and, in any case,
363. In 2004, San Francisco brought claims under the California Constitution’s
Equal Protection Clause, raising state constitutional liberty and privacy protections
to challenge statues limiting same-sex marriage. See In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 675 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). Later, the City intervened in the landmark
case of Perry v. Schwarzenegger, asserting Due Process and Fourteenth Amendment
protections under the federal Constitution. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
These efforts ultimately brought marriage equality to California, and with time, to
the rest of the country. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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with an eye toward greater proportionality. On the one hand,
regulation through data cannot be left unchecked against the
Constitution. On the other, it would be unwise to see the Fourth
Amendment take a Lochner-like turn much like the First
Amendment arguably has done.364 In Europe, conversely, a different
cultural understanding of the role of the public over the private sector
seems to be the defining factor for the relationship between cities and
technology firms. To some extent, the robust privacy framework
enacted at a higher level of government (otherwise present in Canada
as well), but mostly the entrenched conviction of preference for
public ownership over public spaces, drives rhetoric on data
sovereignty spearheaded by Barcelona. However, since technology
firms can gain control over a public infrastructure not only through
procurement but also over the duration of projects, it remains to be
seen whether the promise of Barcelona for a publicly structured smart
city will remain merely rhetorical.
Finally, consistent with the ideal of local autonomy and assuming
cities can exceed a certain constitutionally protected threshold of
privacy interests, cities may choose where to locate themselves on the
sliding scale between privacy activism and data stewardship. Will we
see citizens instead of businesses “vote with their feet,”365 choosing to
live in cities with less privacy but more autonomous cars and security
cameras? Or will the trend of local politicking and the predominance
of Voice over Exit366 signal that more frequent local mobilization can
change policies, as with San Franciscans, which recently banned the
use of facial recognition by the local police force in their city,367 or
what may soon occur in Toronto? Changes might be underway.

364. See Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128
H ARV . L. R EV . F ORUM 165, 166–67 (2015).
365. See Tiebout, supra note 40, at 419–20.
366. See generally Schragger, supra note 28. The reference is to the classic work in
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R ESPONSES TO D ECLINE IN F IRMS , O RGANIZATIONS , AND S TATES (1972)
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share concerns and fight to shape policies on the local level whereas “Exit” signifies a
decision to leave).
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